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Abstract 
We provide a cross-country evidence on the impact of corporate and personal income taxes, and 
corporate governance systems on debt maturity structures and leverage using a comprehensive 
sample of 212,642 firm-year observations based on a sample of 19,573 firms from 24 OECD 
countries over the period 1990 to 2015. We find longer debt maturities, higher leverage, and, in a 
dynamic setting, a greater propensity to decrease short-term debt, in countries with high investor 
protection and where the potentials for debt tax shields and after-tax return of investors are high. 
Our results imply that when investors are protected, firms tend to have optimal debt maturities to 
maximise the gains from tax shields and minimise the tax cost of equity. In contrast, in low 
protection countries, investors prefer their firms to opt for low debt that is mainly short-term to 
mitigate the risk-shifting and debt overhang problems even if this entails forgoing the debt tax 
shields. Our results hold for various robustness checks including the hierarchical linear model 
specification, which corrects for a number of OLS biases.  
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1. Introduction  
Despite the large body of literature on corporate debt maturity structures, the extent to 
which ﬁrms consider fully the costs and benefits of their debt maturity proﬁles is still not well 
understood. On the one hand, when firms face limited availability of long-term financing sources, 
their reliance on predominantly short-term debt exposes them to rollover risk and reduces the 
present value of their tax shields and their growth potentials (e.g., Diamond, 1991). On the other 
hand, short-term debt is valuable as it reduces the power of the managers and controlling 
shareholders (Ben-Nasr et al., 2015) because it is less sensitive to risk shifting in the firm’s 
underlying assets (Barnea et al., 1980), and mitigates debt overhang as it matures sooner than the 
realisation of investment returns (Myers, 1977).1 Long-term debt amplifies these conflicts when 
the refinancing risk is high due to rollover losses (Almeida et al, 2011; Li, 2013), but increases the 
ongoing tax shields (e.g., Scholes and Wolfson, 1992).  
However, Diamond and He (2014) argue that short-term debt can increase or decrease debt 
overhang depending on the timing of the investment. More specifically, debt overhang is reduced 
by short-term debt for assets in place, while it is increased for future investment opportunities, as 
this impact depends on the extent to which the value of short-term debt is sensitive to the value of 
the firm. The equity value becomes more volatile and debt overhang increases when less risk is 
shared with existing short-term debtholders. Such problems can be reduced by national culture 
and institutional settings (Zheng et al., 2012, Turk-Ariss, 2016), restrictive covenants (Billet et al., 
2007) and a selection of higher-quality auditors (El Ghoul et al., 2016). However, short-term debt 
can still mitigate them, despite the tax loss and the rollover risk, when they are severe and the firm 
is in financial distress (Eisdorfer, 2008).  
                                                            
1 Risk shifting occurs when shareholders have incentives to increase the riskiness of the firm's existing assets, even 
when this would reduce the value of their firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Warga and Welch, 1993). Debt overhang 
arises when they have a disincentive to commit new equity capital to be invested in projects that would make debt 
safer, even if these projects were value creating (Myers, 1977). These conflicts between shareholders and debtholders 
exacerbate the underinvestment and asset substitution problems when leverage is high and risky. 
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We contribute to this extensive debate by assessing empirically the impact of various cross-
country and firm-level tax, governance proxies, and rollover risk measures on debt maturity 
structures. We expect firms to opt for longer debt maturities when they are healthy, and when they 
operate in strong investor protection where rollover risks, risk-shifting incentives, and debt 
overhang problems are relatively low. They will also do so if they are in classical tax system 
countries to minimise their shareholder tax cost, and maximise the interest tax shields. In contrast, 
debt maturities in weak governance countries will be shorter to reflect the investors’ reluctance to 
trust the management even if this entails higher tax costs, and the possibility that firms evade taxes 
because their credit information-sharing systems and branch penetration are low (Beck et al., 
2014). We control for other drivers of debt maturity predicted by the signalling (Diamond, 1991; 
Flannery, 1986; Gopalan et al., 2014; Goyal and Wang, 2013), matching (Morris, 1976), and 
macro-economic (Diamond, 1984; Fan et al., 2012) theories to account for the funding availability 
and its access.  
We use a comprehensive sample of 212,642 firm-year observations based on a sample of 
19,573 firms from 24 OECD countries over the period 1990 to 2015 to test our hypothesis. We 
split our firms into strong and weak investor and creditor protection countries, following Djankov 
et al. (2008), and into classical and imputation tax systems, following Alzahrani and Lasfer (2012) 
to assess both the corporate and personal tax impacts. We use Z-score to measure firms’ financial 
distress risk. Our tests account for the simultaneous choice of debt maturity and leverage, in line 
with Johnson (2003) and Datta et al. (2005), as Barclay et al. (2003) suggest that firms 
endogenously choose leverage and debt maturity.  
We show that firms located in strong investor countries exhibit significantly longer debt 
maturities. However, within these countries, the maturities are significantly higher in classical tax 
systems and when the tax advantage of debt relative to equity is high. We find comparable results 
when we analyse leverage. These findings suggest that in strong investor countries, firms prefer 
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long-term debt when the debt tax benefits are high, and when shareholders are faced with a higher 
tax cost on equity financing. In contrast, in weak investor protection countries, the impact of 
taxation on the choice of debt maturity is not consistent with our expectations. We find that 
maturities are higher in imputation compared to the classical tax system, and the relationship is 
relatively weak when we account for all control variables.  
We assess the joint effects of governance and taxation on debt maturity by including an 
interaction variable between investor protection and classical tax system. We find that even after 
accounting for the stand-alone investor protection, the classical tax system, and the tax 
discrimination variables, the interaction between investor protection and tax variables are positive 
and significant. These results support the notion that firms do not set debt maturities because of 
governance and tax systems separately; the combination of tax optimisation and investor 
protection drives their decision to opt for more long-term debt. The tax discrimination effect is 
apparent although Graham (2006) argues that it is difficult to estimate the shareholders’ personal 
income and capital gains taxes and Dyreng et al. (2017) report that US effective corporate tax rates 
are significantly lower than the standard rates.  
We then focus on the agency conflict of debt. In line with Myers’ (1977) arguments that 
firms use shorter maturity debt to minimize the underinvestment problem, we find a negative 
relationship between long-term debt maturity and growth opportunities as measured by the 
market-to-book ratio, used as a proxy for risk shifting (Barnea et al, 1980; Barclay and Smith, 
1995; Guedes and Opler, 1996). However, the abnormal earnings variable is positive and 
significant, consistent with Flannery (1986) and Diamond (1991), but only for healthy firms. For 
distressed companies, its impact is insignificant, probably because they are more concerned with 
their survival than underinvestment and/or signalling. These results suggest that short-term debt 
mitigates the debt overhang problem, as suggested by Myers (1977), but only in good times, in 
line with Diamond and He (2014). We find a homogeneous significant effect of firms’ 
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fundamental variables, such as size, leverage, and asset maturity across all our specifications, 
consistent with previous evidence (e.g., Smith and Watts, 1992; Barclay and Smith, 1995; 
Diamond, 1991).  
In a dynamic setting, we find that the probability of firms increasing their debt maturity is 
positively related to the strong investor protection and creditors’ rights, in classical tax system and 
when the personal tax cost is low. However, this effect is more pronounced when firms are healthy 
and have high growth opportunities and low leverage, i.e., when the potential cost of risk shifting 
is low, in line with Barclay and Smith (1995) and Guedes and Opler (1996). For distressed firms, 
we find that the interaction between investor protection and our tax discrimination variable, rather 
than the tax per se, affects strongly the decision to decrease the debt maturity. Using various 
financial constraints measures (Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist, 2016), we report that constrained 
firms have shorter maturities and lower leverage. Our results suggest that the rollover risk limits 
their access to corporate debt market to borrow and to reﬁnance expiring debt externally (Acharya, 
et al., 2011; Choi et al., 2017). Consequently, this unavailability of external funding opportunities 
is likely to lead firms to liquidate assets inefficiently and/or forgo proﬁtable investment 
opportunities.  
We subject our results to various robustness checks. Our findings are not sensitive to other 
classifications and definitions of the proxy variables. We find similar results when we account for 
all firm and country characteristics and when we exclude US firms. We also observed the impact 
of the severity of distress on debt maturity when we account for all the control variables, as healthy 
firms appear to have significantly lower short-term debt throughout our analysis. Interestingly, in 
both governance systems, the relationship between taxation and maturity is more pronounced in 
healthy rather than distressed firms, whose main concern is survival.  
We contribute to the extensive previous literature by assessing the combined and dynamic 
effects of taxes and governance on debt maturities. We focus on the differences in tax systems 
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following Graham’s (2006) plea that it would be helpful if there were more studies that exploit the 
rich variation in tax codes around the world. Scholes and Wolfson (1992) argue that under the tax 
clientele hypothesis, the greater marginal tax rates facilitate firms to use the on-going interest tax 
shields, and thus firms are more likely to commit to long-term debt. However, Alzahrani and 
Lasfer (2012) show that the tax effect on financial policies is more relevant in strong protection 
countries, where managers are expected to maximise the after-tax return of their shareholders. In 
line with these arguments, we find that in strong protection countries and in the classical tax 
system, where shareholder tax costs are high, firms use longer maturity of debt to maximise their 
debt tax shields and minimise their shareholders’ after-tax returns. Our results suggest that when 
investors are protected, they weigh the tax benefit of debt against the potential agency conflicts of 
extended maturities, but, when they are not, they prefer to incur higher tax costs than to trust the 
management with longer debt maturities.  
Overall, in line with previous evidence (e.g., Demirgüç‐Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; El 
Ghoul et al., 2016; Fan et al., 2012; Turk-Ariss, 2016; Zheng et al., 2012), we assess the influence 
of legal and institutional environments on debt maturity structures. However, we also exploit the 
variation over time of the firm and country variables, and provide evidence on the dynamic joint 
effects of governance and taxation on the firms’ propensity to use long-term debt structures. Our 
results provide an additional perspective to the agency explanation of debt maturity decision and 
show that the interrelation between agency costs and taxation explains leverage and debt maturity 
structures across firms and countries.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides the review of the literature 
and the hypotheses tested. Section 3 presents the data and the methodology. Section 4 discusses 
the empirical results and the conclusions are in Section 5.  
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2. Theoretical background 
There is broad agreement that corporate leverage and debt maturity structures involve a 
trade-off between the costs and benefits of debt. One of the most important costs of debt financing 
is the potential agency conflicts between shareholders and bondholders, in the form of free cash 
flow, underinvestment, and risk shifting problems. Under the Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
framework, Diamond (1991) argues that, unlike long-term debt, shorter-term debt mitigates these 
conflicts because it requires frequent renegotiations and monitoring from banks. Stulz (2000) and 
Rajan and Winton (1995) consider this as a powerful tool to monitor managers with a minimum 
shareholder effort. Myers (1977) suggests also that short-term debt mitigates the underinvestment 
problem, because it matures before the growth opportunities are exercised. Similarly, Barnea et 
al. (1980) link risk-shifting to debt maturity. They argue that since the value of short-term debt is 
less sensitive to changes in asset volatility, issuing short-term debt can reduce risk-shifting 
incentives. Burkart et al. (2003) argue that as investor protection worsens, minority expropriation 
and the incentive of risk-taking behaviour increase, and the dominant shareholders become more 
prevalent. In this case, short-term debt can be used as a mechanism to mitigate any potential 
agency conflicts in weak investor protection countries.  
However, the use of short-term debt results in a loss of an on-going interest tax shields 
(Scholes and Wolfson, 1992) and increases renegotiation costs. Despite the theoretical arguments 
that taxes ought to matter, there is much less agreement on exactly how they affect corporate 
financial policies. Graham (2013) argues that most studies of the impact of taxes on the ﬁrm 
assume that the problem is fixed as the marginal source of ﬁrm ﬁnance is equity, and that dividends 
are ﬁxed exogenously, while in reality, ﬁrms can and do adjust debt to taxes on several dimensions 
in response to taxes on corporate proﬁts, and personal taxes on interest income, dividends, and 
capital gains. Firms can choose leverage and debt maturity considering corporate as well as 
personal income taxes to maximise the wealth of their shareholders.  
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The empirical evidence on these effects is relatively mixed.2 For example, Newberry and 
Novach (1999) find that firms issue bonds with longer maturities when the marginal tax rates are 
higher, but Guedes and Opler (1996) report no tax effect per se, but show that credit-worthy firms 
whose tax rates happen to be high are found at the very long end of the maturity spectrum. In terms 
of governance, Lin et al. (2013) find a positive association between the control-ownership wedge 
of the controlling owner and long-term debt maturity, suggesting that self-interested controlling 
owners prefer long-term debt to avoid monitoring by lenders. However, this creates conflicts 
between controlling and minority shareholders over the maturity structure of debt, and Ben-Nasr 
et al. (2015) show that firms with multiple large shareholders tend to have shorter debt maturities 
because they limit the ability of controlling owners to extract private benefits, as they lead to more 
frequent external monitoring. 
Across countries, some studies attempt to investigate how institutional differences affect 
debt maturity to overcome some of these drawbacks. For example, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1999) find that firms in strong creditor rights countries do not use longer debt 
maturities, but Fan et al. (2012) and Zheng et al. (2012) find that firms located in common law 
countries use longer maturity of debt. Their results suggest that firms in higher investor protection 
countries prefer longer maturity of debt, in line with La Porta et al. (1998), who argue that common 
law countries provide stronger investor protection than civil law countries. However, Turk-Ariss 
(2016) reports that in developing countries less corruption combined with stronger laws increases 
the reliance on long-term debt.3  
                                                            
2 For example, López-Gracia and Mestre-Barberá (2010) show that SMEs use shorter maturity of debt when their tax 
is high. Antoniou et al. (2006) find positive and significant effects of term structure of interest rates on debt maturity 
in the UK, in line with the tax predictions, but inconsistent with Barclay and Smith (1995), Stohs and Mauer (1996), 
Guedes and Opler (1996), and Scherr and Hulburt (2001). Barclay and Smith (1995) and Guedes and Opler (1996) 
show that firms with more growth options (and therefore higher potential agency costs) have more short-term debt in 
their capital structure. However, the tax and agency costs measures used in single country studies are county invariant. 
3 Awartani et al (2016) show that firms in MENA use less debt partly because of their lack of governance. Belkhir et 
al (2016) report that firms in countries where labour enjoys a strong protection tend to use more short-term. Akhtar 
(2017) reports that domestic and multinational firms hold less short- and long-term debt when they operate in an 
imputation tax system, and when they are located in common law countries, they have less short-term but higher long-
term debt. However, the sample is limited to firms from Australia, US, Japan, UK) and Malaysia in 2013. 
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Other studies focus on alternative controlling mechanisms. El Ghoul et al. (2016) show 
that the appointment of Big Four Audit firms can serve as a substitute for short-term debt maturity 
for monitoring purposes as this leads to longer maturities when lenders rely on property rights and 
creditor rights to protect their interests. Billett et al (2007) report that covenant protection increases 
in growth opportunities, debt maturities and leverage, suggesting that debt covenants and short-
term debt are substitutes in controlling the stockholder-bondholder agency conflicts. These factors 
increase the supply side effect of debt. 
Scholes and Wolfson (1993, 312) propose a tax clientele hypothesis to predict the 
relationship between debt maturity and taxes. They argue that companies will prefer to issue long-
term debt obligation rather than a sequence of short-term debt instruments to mitigate the 
transaction costs. However, not all firms can afford to issue long-term debt and avoid the more 
expensive short-term debt securities. They argue that firms with high marginal tax rates form a 
natural clientele for economical long-term debt financing because they can use the implied 
ongoing tax shields provided by long-term debt cost-effectively. This tax clientele effect will lead 
to a positive relation between firms' marginal tax rates and debt maturity structure.  
Newberry and Novack (1999) provide evidence on this clientele effect, but other studies 
ignore tax effects (Fan et al., 2012; Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999) or provide mixed 
evidence (Mateus and Terra, 2013; Zheng et al., 2012). For example, Fan et al. (2012) argue that 
firms in countries with dividend imputation, as opposed to classical, tax system will use less debt. 
They use the Miller (1977) tax gain from leverage to both the firm and its investors. They find that 
leverage is higher in countries where the tax gain is positive, but the tax effect is not as strong and 
pervasive as other inﬂuences, and it affects leverage when measured in book, rather than market, 
value terms. They do not investigate the impact of tax systems on debt maturity.  
In our paper, we expect managers to use more long-term debt to maximise firm value and 
to minimise their investors’ after-tax returns when they operate in strong protection countries and 
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in the classical tax system. We also combine the maturity structure with the firm’s choice of debt 
relative to equity financing. Firms may have a higher long-term debt not only because they have 
less short-term debt, but also because they prefer to use long-term debt rather than equity to finance 
their long-term assets. Conversely, their maturity structure may be short-term if their preference 
is more towards equity than debt. We, therefore, expect firms located in countries with more 
favourable dividend tax environments (imputation tax systems) to prefer more equity financing 
and hence use less long-term debt, but more short-term debt.  
However, these effects will depend on the level of investor protection. In strong protection 
countries where agency costs are less severe, firms are more likely to use longer maturity of debt, 
as managers are more likely to focus on the corporate and the personal income taxes of their 
investors, and opt for a financing method that will maximise their investors’ after-tax returns. In 
contrast, in weak investor protection countries, their objectives may be other than value creation 
and the tax system may not be fully functional (Beck et al., 2014). The combination of the agency 
costs and tax arguments suggests that firms would trade-off the benefit of reducing 
underinvestment/risk-shifting problems against the opportunity cost of interest tax shields when 
they consider using shorter maturity of debt. They are expected to consider these effects when 
they set their target leverage and maturity structures and, in a dynamic setting, when they decide 
to issue different debt maturities and equity. These arguments motivate the following main testable 
hypotheses: 
H1: Firms will opt for longer debt maturities and higher leverage when they operate in 
countries with strong investor protection and where the tax benefits are large.  
H2: In a dynamic setting, changes in debt maturity structures are more likely to be stronger 
in countries with high investor protection and large tax advantages. 
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3. Data and Methodology  
We first collect all firms registered in OECD countries from DataStream. In line with 
Alzahrani and Lasfer (2012), we exclude Korea, Czech Republic, Chile, Estonia, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia for lack or unreliable data. We also exclude 
Finland, Japan, Luxemburg, Poland, and Turkey between 1990 and 1999, as we could not classify 
their tax system due to incomplete data, Germany in 1990-2000, Norway in 1990-1991 and 2006-
2015, Mexico 1990-1991, Sweden 1991-1999, and Poland in 2002 because they apply other tax 
treatments. We also exclude financial firms and firms with negative book equity. Our final sample 
includes 19,573 firms from 24 OECD countries over the sample period 1990 to 2015, resulting in 
212,642 firm-year observations. We collect firm-specific data from DataStream and country-level 
data from several sources detailed in Appendix 1.  
We classify our sample into two broad tax systems (classical and imputation),4 and tax 
differential ratios, TD, where high (low) TD indicates above (below) average TD. This tax 
discrimination variables, defined in Appendix 1, following Miller (1977), increases when the 
corporation tax rate increases, leading to higher potential tax shields, and when the wedge between 
the income tax on dividends income and that on interest income widens, resulting in higher 
investor after-tax returns in the form of debt income. Following Alzahrani and Lasfer (2012) and 
Djankov et al. (2008), we classify firms into strong investor protection group if their country is 
above the average anti-self-dealing index. We, use Z-score to measure financial distress and 
consider firms with Z values below 1.80 to be financially distressed, and market to book ratio to 
account for growth opportunities, in line with Diamond and He (2014). 
We base our primary empirical tests on the following simultaneous equations: 
 
                                                            
4 We find similar results when we follow Alzahrani and Lasfer (2012) and classify the countries into three tax systems, 
classical where shareholders pay personal taxes on after corporation tax distributed earnings, and partial (full) 
imputation systems where they receive tax credit for the corporate taxes paid on earnings partially (fully). 
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where Maturity is long-term debt divided by total debt, Inv is anti-self-dealing index (Djankov et 
al., 2008), CR is creditor right index (Djankov et al., 2007), Classical is a dummy variable equal 
to 1 if the firm is located in a country adopts classical system and zero otherwise, TD is Miller’s 
(1977) tax, and Leverage is long-term debt over long-term debt plus equity.5 We also use the term 
structure of interest rate to proxy for the tax effects (Brick and Ravid, 1985; Garcia-Teruel and 
Martinez-Solano, 2007) even though Scherr and Hulburt (2001), Barclay and Smith (1995), 
Guedes and Oplimer (1996) and Ozkan (2000) cast doubt on the tax effect.  
Since the estimation of each equation separately will result in biased and inconsistent 
estimated coefficients because of simultaneous equation bias, we follow Billett et al. (2007) and 
use generalized method of moments (GMM) with the exogenous variables as instruments in the 
moment conditions. Greene (2002) and Kennedy (2003) observe that GMM estimates are more 
efficient than two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates when regression errors are heteroskedastic 
and/ or autocorrelated, and that GMM estimates coincide with 2SLS estimates otherwise. Thus, 
GMM ensures that the standard errors of the estimates are robust to heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation. Since there is no guarantee that the R2s reported in GMM estimation techniques 
lie between zero and one (Goldberger 1991), there is no well-accepted goodness of fit measure for 
GMM estimations (Billett et al., 2007), and therefore, we do not report the R2s for our estimated 
equations.  
                                                            
5 For the purpose of our hypotheses, we include long-term debt to measure leverage (see section 2).  
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𝛽𝛽5𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀,𝑀𝑀 +  𝛽𝛽6𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀 ,𝑀𝑀 + 𝛽𝛽7𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀,𝑀𝑀 + 𝛽𝛽8𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀 ,𝑀𝑀 +
𝛽𝛽9𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 ,𝑀𝑀 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘  16𝑘𝑘=1 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀,𝑀𝑀 + 𝜀𝜀𝑀𝑀 ,𝑀𝑀                                               (2) 
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We use firm-level variables to capture the signalling, tax, agency costs, and matching 
effects. In the presence of information asymmetries, Flannery (1986) shows that high-quality firms 
use short-term debt to signal to the market that they are confident they will honour their debt 
obligations. While both long- and short-term debt are mispriced, only long-term debt is more 
sensitive to asymmetric information. In this case, high-quality firms will issue short-term debt to 
signal to the market that they can afford to repay the short-term obligations and to cover the 
transaction costs of debt renegotiation, while low-quality firms cannot afford to roll over short-
term debt, and hence prefer to issue long-term debt. We proxy firms’ quality using abnormal 
earnings as in Stohs and Mauer (1996), and Barclay and Smith (1995). 
The asset maturity hypothesis predicts that firms mitigate their financial risk, which arises 
when their cash flows are not sufficient to cover their commitments, by matching their debt and 
their assets maturities (Morris, 1976). Debt with maturity longer than the maturity of assets is risky 
because the assets may not be enough to cover the debt covenants. To proxy for this effect, we use 
property, plant and machinery over depreciation.  
Throughout our analysis we control for the firm’s financial constraints, even though Farre-
Mensa and Ljungqvist (2016) show that no measure is satisfactory. We first expect firms that pay 
dividends to have sufficient internal funds at their disposal to honor their contractual obligations, 
to finance their investments, and to meet their shareholders’ expectations, and are, therefore, less 
likely to be financially constrained (e.g., Fazzari et al., 1988). We consider, however, that the use 
of payout in our case may be problematic because according to La Porta et al. (2000b) weak 
governance firms may pay low dividends if payouts emanate from a legal protection of minority 
shareholders (outcome model), or high dividends if they are substitute for weak shareholder 
protection (substitute model). We, therefore, use Whited and Wu (2006) index as an alternative 
measure of financial constraints.  
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At the country level, Fan et al. (2012) consider the capital suppliers’ preferences on the 
structure of debt maturity.6 They argue that firms in countries with a developed banking system 
tend to use more short-term debt as banks hold more short-term liabilities. Conversely, firms in 
countries with a larger insurance sector are more likely to use long-term debt, because insurance 
companies, like pension funds, are long-term investors. Unlike Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(1999), they find a negative impact of the banking sector on debt maturity. 
We use banks’ deposits over gross domestic product (GDP) to measure the available funds 
from the banking sector as a proxy for the preferences of the suppliers of the capital. We expect 
that firms in countries with a bigger banking sector to use more short-term debt. However, banks’ 
risk will also affect their lending and maturity choices. We, therefore, use a number of bank risk 
measures. The first is banks’ credit over their deposits. High-credit banks have a greater ability to 
pay their debt when it is due, thereby reducing the risk of banks run, implying that firms in 
countries with low-risk banks to use long-term debt. The second is the insurance sector, as proxied 
by insurance premium (life and non-life) over GDP. We expect firms in countries with a bigger 
insurance sector to use higher long-term debt. Finally, to account for liquidity, we use the ratio of 
gross domestic savings over GDP to measure the amount of funds available for all financial 
intermediaries. These proxy variables for debt supply imply that firms in countries with a greater 
supplier of capital use more long-term debt.  
Grossman (1976) argues that prices of listed companies transfer information that can be 
useful for creditors, and hence lending quoted firms to be less risky due to their transparency in 
the stock market. We expect firms in countries with developed stock markets to have higher access 
to long-term credit, thus, more likely to use more long-term debt. Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(1999) show that leverage and debt maturity increase with the size of stock markets. In addition, 
                                                            
6 Demirg¨uc¸-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) argue that some country-level data may raise endogeneity problems and 
hence we follow Fan et al. (2012) and use the selected variables that are less likely to cause endogeneity issue. 
However, in contrast to Fan et al. (2012), we do not control for bankruptcy code and deposit insurance, as they do not 
vary across tax system, particularly in our strong protection countries. 
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higher bond market development provides a better protection for borrowers. Hence, we expect 
firms in countries with better and diversified bond markets, measured by bond market 
capitalisations over GDP, international debt issued over GDP, and loans from non-resident banks 
over GDP, to use more long-term debt.  
Finally, we control for the economic and industry effect condition using inflation and 
yearly industry median of debt maturity, respectively. Inflation makes it costly for firms and 
investors to contract (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999), thus firms will use more short-term 
debt when the inflation rate, measured by changes in consumer price index, is high. 
Table 1 reports summary statistics of the variables used in our analysis. The mean (median) 
debt maturity 0.58 (0.64), in line with previous evidence (e.g., Fan et al., 2012; Zheng et al., 2012; 
Dang, 2011), but lower than the 0.78 reported by Datta et al. (2005) and 0.86 for the developing 
countries reported by Turk-Ariss (2016). The average book leverage of 0.28 is likewise consistent 
with previous evidence (e.g., Antoniou et al., 2008; Fan et al., 2012). Our sample is relatively 
evenly distributed across the classical and imputation tax systems and 56% of our sample firms 
are in strong investor protection countries (see Appendix 2 for details). However, the average 
(median) TD of 0.06 (0.03) is relatively smaller comparing to, for example, the 0.14 (0.13) 
reported by Fan et al. (2012), although the standard deviation is the same. The dissimilarities in 
the countries selected are likely to drive these differences. In particular, while we focus on the 24 
OECD countries, Fan et al. (2012) base their analysis on 36,767 firms from 39 different countries 
from 1991 to 2006. Our extended sample period could also have contributed to this difference as 
many countries have recently lowered their corporate tax rates. The remaining variables are 
relatively in line with most previous evidence. 
[Insert Table 1 here]   
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4. Empirical Results  
In this section, we first present the univariate results. We then report the regression results 
on the determinants of the level and changes in debt maturity and leverage. Finally, we test for 
robustness of our results using different specifications.  
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics to assess the impact of financial health, 
governance, and taxation on debt maturity. We test for differences in means using the t-test. We 
report the average debt maturity in Panel A, and leverage in Panel B. We find similar results when 
we use total debt over total assets, and long-term debt over long-term debt plus the market value 
of equity.  
The results show that the distribution of maturity structures and leverage across 
governance, financial health, and tax systems is not homogenous. Debt has longer maturity in 
strong protection countries across different tax systems, and independently of the firm’s financial 
strength. The economic impact is relatively stronger for healthy firms, particularly in our 
classification by investor protection. The distribution by tax discrimination variable also indicates 
that firms that operate in the classical tax system appear to have longer debt maturities than those 
that are in the imputation system, with the exception of the distressed firms in the strong investor 
protection group. The distribution by tax discrimination variable indicates that firms that operate 
in countries where the after-tax return of shareholders is higher have longer maturities. Consistent 
with the tax hypothesis, firms in strong investor protection have higher debt financing when they 
operate in imputation tax systems, independently of their financial strength. However, we do not 
observe this behaviour in other classifications.  
The distribution of maturity by growth options, as measured by the market-to-book ratio, 
provides mixed evidence. As expected, low growth firms appear to have longer debt maturities, 
but this applies to only the case of distressed firms in strong investor protection countries and in 
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weak investor protection countries. In other countries, the relationship is either positive or not 
significant. When we sort our companies by leverage, we find that, as expected, firms with longer 
maturities are more likely to have high leverage. The results are relatively similar when we use 
creditor protection. Finally, Panel A. indicates that the impact of distress on debt maturity is 
relatively mixed across our groupings.  
Panel B reports the distribution of leverage by governance, tax, and firms’ financial health. 
The results, not reported, indicate that firms in high governance countries have a relatively similar 
level of debt than firms in low governance systems. In both systems, the distribution of long-term 
debt is relatively monotonic across the tax systems and firms’ characteristics. Leverage is high for 
firms that operate in a classical tax system, suggesting that these firms prefer debt rather than 
equity financing when the potential tax shields are high, in line with Fan et al. (2012), but the 
Miller (1977) tax differential ratio does not affect significantly leverage, as the results are 
relatively mixed.  
In contrast, the relationship between leverage and market to book is, as expected negative 
in most cases, suggesting that mature companies have higher leverage. The last two rows indicate 
that long-term debt maturities appear to lead to significantly higher leverage. Throughout our 
classifications, the distress factor is predominant: distressed firms appear to have significantly 
higher leverage than healthy firms.  
 [Insert Table 2 here] 
4.2. Regression Results 
In this section, we report the results of our regression tests. We estimate the system of 
equations by generalized method of moments (GMM) which ensures that standard errors of the 
estimates are heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent, followed by Probit regressions to 
investigate the impact of taxation and governance on the decision to change debt maturity. 
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4.2.1. Determinants of Debt Maturity Structure  
Table 3 reports the simultaneous equations (1) and (2). The second column indicates that, 
for the sample as a whole, firms are more likely to have longer debt maturities when they operate 
in classical tax system and when the tax discrimination variable (TD) is high. The economic 
significance of these results is important. For example, an increase in the tax benefit of debt (TD) 
by one (sample) standard deviation (i.e. using Table 1, an increase in TD of 0.16 points) would 
increase maturity of debt (in logarithmic) by approximately 69 percentage points 
[ln(0.16)*0.407/ln(0.34) = 0.69]. Our results imply that firms prefer long-term debt when they can 
benefit from high recurring tax shields, and when their investors’ equity income is taxed at a 
relatively higher rate than debt income. The results also show that firms located in strong investor 
protections (Inv) and high creditors’ right (CR) have longer debt maturities. The economic 
significance of these findings suggests that an increase in investor protection by one (sample) 
standard deviation (i.e. using Table 1, an increase in Inv of 0.19 points) would increase debt 
maturity (in logarithmic) by approximately 39 percentage points [ln(0.19)*0.261/ln(0.34) = 0.39]. 
For creditors’ right, the economic significance is close to zero.      
The interactions between investor protection and tax variables (Inv*Classical and Inv*TD) 
are positive and significant suggesting that the tax impact is more observed in strong investor 
protection countries. These results are in line with Burkart et al. (2003) who argue that in strong 
investor protection managers have a greater discretion to reduce risk-taking, and, hence, borrowers 
in less risky businesses have lower incentives to lower agency costs by shortening maturity 
(Guedes and Opler, 1996). La Porta et al. (2000a) argue that the corporate governance that 
accompanies broad financial markets is more effective, the supply of capital is more efficient, and 
the credit market is larger than in weak investor protection countries. Boubakri and Gouma (2010) 
also show that higher investors’ protection reduces bond spreads and increases corporate bond 
ratings. These arguments suggest that firms have a better access to long-term debt in strong 
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investor protection countries. The economic impact is also large, as firms which are located in 
stronger investor protection countries with a higher tax benefit of debt would increase the maturity 
of debt (in logarithmic) by approximately 78 percentage points.7 The results are relatively similar 
for the interaction between creditors’ right and tax variables (CR*Classical and CR*TD). For 
example, economically, firms which are located in higher creditors’ right countries with a higher 
tax benefit of debt would increase the maturity of debt (in logarithmic) by approximately 32 
percentage points.  
The control variables are as expected. Firms with low long-term debt are more likely to be 
high growth (measured by the market-to-book ration, MB), financially constrained (measured by 
WW-index, WWindex), large, healthy, and have long asset maturities. Similarly, at the macro 
level, firms in countries with high bank deposits, high bank credit, and high stock liquidity are 
more likely to rely on long-term debt financing. We find that firms located in countries with a 
bigger banking system, as measured by bank deposits, use more long-term debt, suggesting that 
maturity is affected by the supply of debt, but in contrast with Fan et al. (2012) who find that banks 
tend to hold more short-term liabilities, and hence offer mainly short-term loans.  
 Consistent with the preference of capital suppliers, we find that, firms in countries with a 
bigger insurance sector use long-term debt, inconsistent with Fan et al. (2012). We also measure 
the amount of funds available for all financial intermediaries by gross domestic saving over GDP 
and do not find that firms with a greater level of domestic savings have more long-term debt. In 
line with Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), active stock markets, measured by stock traded 
over GDP, promote the use of long-term debt, and the inflation rate is negatively associated with 
long-term debt, consistent with Fan et al. (2012).  
                                                            
7The economic significance for the interaction Inv*TD is [ln(0.08)*0.339/ln(0.34) = 0.78]. However, the economic 
significance for Inv*TD is relatively small [ln(0.27)*0.163/ln(0.34) = 0.19]. The standard deviation for interaction 
variables are not reported in Table 2 for space considerations.  
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In columns 3 and 4, we assess whether our results are different for healthy and distressed 
firms. For healthy firms, the results are qualitatively similar and more pronounced, except for the 
significance of abnormal earnings (AB). In contrast, for distressed firms, while growth 
opportunities (MB), abnormal earnings to proxy for firms’ quality (AB), and WW index are not 
significant. The dummy for dividend payers (Dividends) is negatively related to debt maturity 
structures, suggesting that firms that pay dividends have more short-term debt for monitoring 
purposes. The impact of country-level variables are relatively similar between healthy and distress 
firms expect domestic saving (Savings) which is insignificant for distressed firms. In addition, the 
tax discrimination (TD) and classical tax dummy (Classical) are not significant when firms are 
distressed, suggesting that the tax effects for financially distressed companies are irrelevant 
because they are making losses, thus they would not benefit from interest tax shields. The 
interactions between investor protection and tax variables (Inv*Classical and Inv*TD) are 
insignificant while creditors’ right and investor protection variables on their own are significant. 
These results suggest that the tax impact is not observed for distressed firms. This is, however, not 
the case when we use creditors’ rights as the interaction between CR and TD is positive and 
significant. Overall, our results imply that, in weak investor protection countries, managers may 
not consider the tax benefits if their objective is not to maximise shareholder value, or if their tax 
system is inefficient as reported by Beck et al. (2014). The impact of the term structure of interest 
rate, TS, a proxy for the tax effect (Brick and Ravid, 1985) is weak for distressed firms, in line 
with Barclay and Smith (1995), and Stohs and Mauer (1996).  
In Table 3, columns 5 to 7, we report the results when the dependent variable is leverage. 
Column 5 indicates that firms in countries with strong investor protection, high creditors’ rights, 
classical tax system, and where TD is high, have relatively higher leverage. These firms are more 
likely to have longer debt maturities, low growth (MB), low profitability (ROA), but high 
tangibility of assets (Tg). They are also large and less likely to be financially distressed. The 
21 
 
positive relationship between leverage and long-term debt maturity across countries is consistent 
with Morris (1992), who argues that firms with higher leverage use long-term debt to postpone 
their probability of bankruptcy, but inconsistent with Dennis et al. (2000), who show that leverage 
is inversely related to debt maturity.  
Firms with higher growth opportunities, as measured by the market-to-book ratio, use 
shorter debt maturities to mitigate the underinvestment problem, in line with Myers (1977), 
Barclay and Smith (1995) and Guedes and Opler (1996), but in contrast with Stohs and Mauer 
(1996). Firms with high leverage are likely to be in countries where bank deposit and inflation is 
low, but bank credit, bond capital, stock liquidity, and domestic savings are high. The remaining 
results are relatively similar to the findings for debt maturity. The results indicate that, the 
interactions between investor protections and classical dummy as well as TD are positive and 
significant, suggesting that firms in countries where shareholders and creditors are protected, and 
where the tax benefits are high, have a higher level of debt.  The results for healthy (Column 6) 
and distressed (Column 7) firms suggest that these fundamental effects on leverage are mainly 
observed in strong investor countries and when firms are not distressed. 
[Insert Table 3 here]  
 
4.2.2 Changes in Debt Maturity  
Table 4 reports the results of the impact of taxation and governance on the decision to 
change debt maturity and leverage. We follow Rivers and Vuong (1988) econometrics 
specification and estimate the following simultaneous Probit regressions: Pr�𝛥𝛥 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 1� =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +  𝛽𝛽3 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 ∗
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +  𝛽𝛽6𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽7𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽8𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽9𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +
∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 17𝑘𝑘=1 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                                                                                                        (3) 
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Pr�𝛥𝛥 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 1� =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +  𝛽𝛽3 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 ∗
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +  𝛽𝛽6𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽7𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽8𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽9𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +
∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 16𝑘𝑘=1 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                                                  (4) 
where Pr(Δ Maturityi,t=1) and Pr(Δ Leveragei,t=1) are indicators of firms in our sample that 
increase their long-term debt maturity, and leverage, respectively. Following Rivers and Vuong 
(1988), we use a two-stage estimation procedure. In the first stage, we replace the endogenous 
variables with their predicted values to control for endogeneity (Wooldridge, 2002). We follow 
Dang (2011) to select the instruments for the exogenous variables in our model. For Equation (3), 
we use tangibility and non-debt tax shields, defined as depreciation over total assets, as 
instruments for leverage as they are not theoretically related to debt maturity (Dang, 2011; 
Johnson, 2003). For Equation (4), we follow Dang (2011) and use asset maturity (AM) and term 
structure of interest rates (TS) as instrumental values for debt maturity. We consider other 
variables, such as, tax ratio, growth opportunities, and firm quality, are potentially correlated with 
leverage (e.g., Frank and Goyal, 2009).  
The results of the second stage are reported in Table 4.8 Column 2, shows that, for the full 
sample, firms in strong investor protection countries with classical tax systems and where tax 
benefits of debt are higher (Inv*Classical and Inv*TD) are more likely to increase the maturity 
structure of their debt. Comparable results are observed for the interaction of TD and investor 
protection and when the dependent variable is defined as maintaining, rather than increasing, debt 
maturity. The impact of these variables separately is relatively weak, suggesting that a 
combination of the governance and tax systems that is more likely to affect changes in debt 
maturity. The results also indicate that the marginal effects (MEs) are evident: on average, a unit 
increase in the tax benefit of debt leads firms to increase their long-term debt by about 10 basis 
points. The marginal impact of the interaction variables is even more pronounced. The results 
                                                            
8 We do not report the results of the predicted values in the first stage for space considerations.  
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indicate that firms in countries that operate the classical tax system and where TD is high tend to 
reduce their short-term debt, and thus, increase their long-term debt. However, the marginal effect 
of the creditors and investors protection variables is relatively smaller and insignificant. When we 
split our sample into healthy and distressed firms, the impacts of tax (Classical and TD) and 
governance (CR and Inv) are more pronounced for healthy firms, while these results become 
insignificant when firms are distressed.  
Firms with high leverage are also more likely to increase their long-term maturity and to 
opt for long-term debt, in line with Morris (1992). The marginal effect ranges between 0.088 and 
0.20, considering the full sample and different clarifications. The impact of asset maturity (AM) is 
also significant, except when firms are financially distressed. The impact of growth (MB) is 
significant, but, only for healthy firms. The effects of the remaining variables are relatively weak. 
In particular, the results show that larger companies with greater asset maturities and lower growth 
opportunities are not necessarily more likely to increase their long-term debt, in contrast to our 
predictions. These results are not in line with Barclay and Smith (1995) and Stohs and Mauer 
(1996) who show that long-term debt increases with size and asset maturity, and decreases with 
growth opportunities. However, they are relatively consistent with Guedes and Opler (1996) who 
find that size has a U-shaped impact on debt maturity, suggesting that firms issue in the middle of 
the maturity spectrum, while larger firms issue at both extremes of debt maturities. 
 [Insert Table 4 here] 
4.2.3 Robustness Check  
In this section, we conduct several robustness checks of our empirical findings to assess 
further the impact of the interaction between taxation and investor protection on short-term debt 
maturity and leverage. We report the results in Table 5. The control variables remained relatively 
the same, thus we do not report them. In Panel A, we test for alternative measures of the investor 
protection variable by replacing the anti-self-dealing index with the revised anti-directors' rights 
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of Spamann (2010). The results in Panel A are qualitatively similar. The tax and governance 
variables (Inv and CR) and the interaction between these variables are all significant. These results 
provide further evidence that firms that operate in strong investor protection, classical tax system, 
and where the investor after-tax return on debt income is higher than equity income, have higher 
leverage and longer debt maturities. The results are qualitatively similar for healthy firms. 
However, for distressed firms, the impact is relatively weak and insignificant, except for the 
interaction between CR and TD. The results for distressed firms suggest that governance systems 
and taxes alone do not explain a large proportion of the debt maturity structures. 
In Panel B, we follow Mehran and Prestiani (2010) and Bharath and Dittmar (2010), and 
measure distress using the following bankruptcy time length:  h�t, X (t)� = h(t, 0) 𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(B X(t))              (5) 
where h (t, X(t)) is the hazard rate at time t for a firm with covariates X(t). This model controls for 
the effects of differences between firms as well as changes over time. We account for related 
factors. We also assume that there is a probability of bankruptcy every year to satisfy the 
assumption of proportional hazard in which the explanatory variables are time-invariant. We 
classify our firms as healthy (distressed) if the hazard rate is below (above) the sample mean. The 
Hazard ratio is, like Z-score, highly significant and the remaining results are qualitatively similar. 
The coefficients of the interaction variables of TD, Classical, and investor protection are more 
sizable for the sample as a whole. The results are also more robust for healthy firms.  
In Panel C, we test for robustness of our estimation techniques. Since our data structure is 
multilevel, we use the following hierarchical linear models (HLM) specification (Li et al., 2013), 
where the set of firms within countries forms the base-level observations, while countries are the 
higher-level observations:  
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where the dependent variables in Equations (6) and (7) are long-term debt maturity and leverage, 
respectively. Following Li et al. (2013), we include firm-level deviations (-firmdev) and country-
level means (-ctrymean) and grand-mean centred country-level deviations (-ctry) to account for 
country-level effects.9  
This HLM specification allows us to separate the variance in firm-level debt maturity and 
leverage from the country-level effect in the explanatory variables. It also corrects for the 
distortion introduced by varying sample sizes across countries, and avoids the OLS bias, as the 
coefficient on a country-level variable can be spuriously significant simply because of the large 
sample size at the firm level. This problem is accentuated when countries differ markedly in the 
number of firms in the sample. Unlike the OLS regression, where each firm-level observation 
receives equal weight, HLM simultaneously models regressions at both the firm and the country 
                                                            
9 For Maturity (Leverage) HLM regression, K is the number of control variables. This is 9 (8) for both firm-level 
deviations, -firmdev, and firm-level country means, -ctrymean, and 8 (8) for grand-mean centred country-level 
deviations, -ctry. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Following Li et al. (2013), we centre the variables to 
decompose the firm- and country-level variation in the following order: (i) country-level variables by grand mean 
(i.e., average across countries) and add the suffix “_ctry” to each one; (ii) each firm-level independent variable by its 
grand mean (i.e., average across countries and firms), and (iii) we create country-level mean values (average within a 
country) on those grand-mean centred variables at the firm level in the previous step, and we add the suffix 
“_ctrymean” to each transformed firm-level variable; (iv) Finally, we create within-country residuals by taking the 
grand-mean adjusted variables in step 2 and subtracting the corresponding within-country means in step 3, and we 
add the suffix “_firmdev” which is separated from their corresponding country-level means “_ctrymean”.  
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levels. We weigh the country-level regression by the precision of the firm-level data, which is 
inversely related to the sample size within a country. Moreover, the HLM specification accurately 
incorporates cross-level interactions between the firm- and country-level variables.  
Our results, reported in Table 5, Panel C, are qualitatively similar. Taxes, governance, and 
their interaction are significant, suggesting that although governance systems and taxes alone 
explain long-term debt decisions, the combinations of those factors affect debt maturity structures 
more significantly. The results for healthy firms are relatively similar, but, in contrast to the 
distressed sample, when firms are healthy the tax benefit of debt is more evident. 
Next, we follow Zheng et al. (2012) and examine the robustness of our findings by 
controlling further for the corporate governance and institutional settings. Although these 
additional control variables tend to reduce the sample size significantly due to limited data, we 
report the results in two stages in Table 5, Panels D and E. In Panel D, we add Private Credit, 
GINI index, and Governance Control to control for corruptions. In Panel E, we include the ultimate 
cash flow rights of the largest shareholders (Cash flow rights) to proxy for the alignment effect, 
and the ultimate voting rights minus ultimate cash flow rights of the largest shareholders (Diverge) 
to proxy for internment effect. In Panel D, we find, but not report for space considerations, that 
high corruption and high income equality reduce firms’ debt maturity and leverage. The results 
are similar in Panel E. We also find, but not report for brevity, that Diverge is associated with 
shorter maturity of debt, in line with Zheng et al. (2012), while it is insignificant for leverage. The 
Cash flow rights variable is associated with longer debt maturities and leverage. Despite the 
reduction in our sample size, the main results are relatively similar, suggesting that the impacts of 
tax and governance are not affected by the inclusion of these additional control variables.10  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
                                                            
10 Our results are qualitatively similar when we repeat our regressions for strong and weak protections subsample. For 
brevity, we did not report the results. 
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5. Conclusions 
Using a sample of 212,642 firm-year observations covering 19,573 firms from 24 OECD 
countries from 1990 to 2015, we find that both firm and country level factors affect debt maturities. 
We expand previous studies by providing a relatively deeper analysis of the combined impact of 
investor protection and taxation on leverage and debt maturity structures. We show that these 
factors explain a sizeable proportion of the levels and changes in debt levels and maturities, as in 
countries where investors are protected, firms appear to set optimally these decisions to maximise 
the gains from tax shields and minimise their investors’ tax costs. In contrast, in low protection 
countries, debt levels are low with shorter maturities and not strongly related to the tax factors. 
These results suggest that investors prefer their firms to opt for low debt that is mainly short-term 
as they are likely to be more concerned about the mitigation of the debt overhang and risk-shifting 
problems than tax gains. We also consider that these decisions are affected by firms’ financial 
health to proxy for debt overhang and risk shifting. We find that healthy firms have significantly 
lower short-term debt and higher leverage and the relationship between taxation and maturity is 
more pronounced in healthy rather than distressed firms that are likely to be more concerned with 
survival rather than tax saving. We find similar results when we test for various robustness checks.  
Our results may suffer from limitations inherent in cross-country studies, specifically, if 
the accounting numbers are not comparable, firms are subject to tax and governance structures in 
other than their country of registration, face different effective corporate and personal tax rates, 
and have other internal and external corporate governance mechanisms to mitigate their agency 
conflicts. Moreover, while we focus only on firm-level aggregate debt levels and maturities, in 
practice, these decisions encompass different debt types, sources and seniorities. The financial 
crisis may have also affected leverage and maturity decisions, but we have not accounted for it as 
its impact is not homogeneous across our countries. These limitations are likely to have an impact 
on our analysis. Unfortunately, data on these disaggregated considerations is not available and the 
extent to which they will strengthen or alter our results is the subject of further research. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics of firm- and country-level variables 
Variables N Mean SD Minimum 25th percentile Median 75th Percentile Maximum 
Maturity 
Leverage 
Inv 
CR 
Classical 
TD 
MB 
Size 
AB 
ROA 
AM 
Tg 
Zscore 
WW index 
Dividends 
Ind. Med 
TS 
Bank Dep. 
Bank Credit 
Ins. Prem. 
Bond Cap. 
Inter. Debt  
Stock Traded 
Inflation 
Savings 
212,642 
212,642 
212,642 
212,642 
212,642 
212,642 
212,642 
212,642 
211,158 
212,642 
212,642 
212,642 
212,642 
212,642 
212,642 
212,642 
210,716 
212,642 
212,642 
212,642 
207,787 
212,642 
207,450 
212,642 
212,642 
0.58 
0.28 
0.60 
2.00 
0.49 
0.06 
1.39 
9.18 
-0.26 
0.00 
2.35 
0.88 
1.57 
-0.51 
0.53 
0.00 
0.68 
0.93 
0.84 
0.07 
1.01 
0.34 
0.99 
0.02 
0.23 
0.34 
0.27 
0.19 
1.07 
0.50 
0.16 
1.80 
4.34 
0.04 
0.08 
4.41 
0.16 
2.89 
0.17 
0.50 
0.01 
1.13 
0.66 
0.58 
0.03 
0.73 
0.29 
0.68 
0.03 
0.07 
0.00 
0.00 
0.17 
0.00 
0.00 
-0.58 
0.00 
-4.61 
-0.09 
-0.21 
0.02 
0.45 
-4.57 
-0.79 
0.00 
-0.01 
-1.87 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
-0.04 
0.00 
0.29 
0.01 
0.50 
1.00 
0.00 
-0.03 
0.01 
5.65 
-0.01 
-0.01 
0.16 
0.82 
0.18 
-0.64 
0.00 
0.00 
-0.03 
0.58 
0.50 
0.05 
0.51 
0.09 
0.50 
0.01 
0.19 
 
0.64 
0.20 
0.64 
2.00 
0.00 
0.03 
1.03 
10.54 
0.00 
-0.01 
0.37 
0.97 
2.00 
-0.53 
1.00 
0.00 
0.81 
0.80 
0.78 
0.07 
0.89 
0.30 
0.78 
0.02 
0.23 
0.91 
0.47 
0.76 
3.00 
1.00 
0.17 
1.96 
12.53 
0.01 
0.08 
0.90 
1.00 
3.11 
-0.40 
1.00 
0.02 
1.40 
1.07 
1.27 
0.08 
1.43 
0.49 
1.27 
0.03 
0.27 
 
1.00 
0.88 
0.95 
4.00 
1.00 
0.58 
6.72 
20.05 
0.09 
0.17 
16.24 
1.00 
8.34 
-0.16 
1.00 
0.04 
2.56 
3.90 
16.47 
0.18 
2.65 
2.66 
2.84 
0.55 
0.54 
The sample includes 212,642 firm/year observations from 24 OECD countries. We define the variables in Appendix 1. N is for number of observations, SD is standard deviation. 
We winsorized the data at the top and bottom 1%. 
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Table 2: Tests for Mean Differences   
Strong Investor Protection Weak Investor Protection Strong Creditor Protection Weak Creditor Protection 
 
Healthy H Distressed D (H-D) Healthy H Distressed D (H-D) Healthy H Distressed D (H-D) Healthy H Distressed D (H-D) 
Panel A: Maturity (Long-term debt/ total debt) 
Classical (1) 0.65 0.62 0.03** 0.53 0.56 -0.03** 0.62 0.60 0.02 0.60 0.63 -0.03*** 
Imputation (2)         0.62 0.65 -0.03** 0.47 0.50 -0.03** 0.50 0.54 -0.04 0.45 0.49 -0.04*** 
(1) – (2) 0.03** -0.03** 
 
0.06*** 0.06*** 
 
0.12*** 0.06*** 
 
0.15*** 0.14*** 
 
High TD 0.66 0.63 0.03*** 0.48 0.52 -0.04*** 0.63 0.60 0.03** 0.57 0.55 0.020* 
Low TD 0.63 0.60 0.03** 0.48 0.51 -0.03*** 0.58 0.52 0.06*** 0.48 0.53 -0.05*** 
High-Low 0.03** 0.03* 
 
0.00 0.01 
 
0.05*** 0.08** 
 
0.09*** 0.02* 
 
High MB 0.65 0.55 0.10*** 0.46 0.50 -0.04*** 0.63 0.59 0.04** 0.57 0.56 0.01 
Low MB 0.62 0.64 -0.02 0.50 0.53 -0.03* 0.58 0.55 0.03* 0.54 0.55 -0.01 
High-Low 0.03** -0.09*** 
 
-0.04** -0.03* 
 
0.05*** 0.04**  0.03** 0.01  
High Leverage 0.87 0.86 0.01 0.68 0.62 0.06*** 0.83 0.79 0.04*** 0.78 0.71 0.07*** 
Low Leverage 0.53 0.38 0.15*** 0.41 0.33 0.08*** 0.51 0.38 0.13*** 0.46 0.34 0.12*** 
High-Low 0.34*** 0.48*** 
 
0.27*** 0.29*** 
 
0.32*** 0.41*** 
 
0.32*** 0.37*** 
 
Panel B: Leverage (long-term debt/ long-term debt +book value of equity) 
Classical (1) 0.24 0.36 -0.12*** 0.18 0.43 -0.25*** 0.22 0.44 -0.22*** 0.22 0.41 -0.19*** 
Imputation (2)        0.22 0.37 -0.37*** 0.16 0.40 -0.24*** 0.17 0.38 -0.16*** 0.18 0.36 -0.18*** 
(1) – (2) 0.24*** -0.01  0.02** 0.03**  0.05*** 0.06***  0.04*** 0.05*** 
 
High TD 0.22 0.35 -0.13*** 0.18 0.41 -0.23*** 0.15 0.35 -0.20*** 0.23 0.38 -0.15*** 
Low TD 0.20 0.31 -0.11*** 0.18 0.42 -0.24*** 0.21 0.41 -0.20*** 0.20 0.36 -0.16*** 
High-Low 0.02** 0.04*** 
 
0.00 -0.01 
 
-0.06*** -0.06*** 
 
0.03*** 0.02** 
 
High MB 0.21 0.36 -0.15*** 0.17 0.41 -0.24*** 0.18 0.38 -0.20*** 0.20 0.35 -0.15*** 
Low MB 0.23 0.37 -0.14*** 0.19 0.42 -0.23*** 0.21 0.41 -0.20*** 0.23 0.38 -0.15*** 
High-Low -0.02** -0.01 
 
-0.02** -0.01 
 
-0.03** -0.03 
 
-0.03** -0.03** 
 
High Maturity 0.51 0.30 0.21*** 0.54 0.27 0.27*** 0.53 0.28 0.25*** 0.51 0.30 0.21*** 
Low Maturity 0.10 0.06 0.04*** 0.32 0.12 0.20*** 0.26 0.10 0.16*** 0.17 0.08 0.09*** 
High-Low 0.41*** 0.24*** 
 
0.10*** 0.15*** 
 
0.27*** 0.18*** 
 
0.34*** 0.22*** 
 
This table reports the tests for mean differences of short-term debt maturity, Maturity, measured as short-term debt over total debt (Panel A), and long-term book value of leverage, Leverage 
(Panel B). Strong (weak) investor protection is when anti-self-dealing index score reported by Djankov et al. (2008) is above (below) the mean overall scores. Strong (weak) creditor protection is 
when creditor rights index score reported by Djankov et al. (2007) is above (below) the mean overall scores. High (low) TD is when Miller Tax ratio is larger (smaller) than the overall mean. 
Firms with Z-score below 1.80 are financially distressed. We use the median per country as the benchmark in our market-to-book ratios, MB, long-term book value of leverage, Leverage and 
long-term debt maturity, Maturity, groups. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
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Table 3: Determinants of Debt Maturity Structure and Leverage 
 Maturity: Long-term debt/ total debt Leverage: (Long-term debt/ long-term debt + equity)  
All Healthy Distressed All Healthy Distressed 
Classical 0.148*** 0.178*** 0.084 0.050*** 0.048** 0.012  
(4.65) (6.38) (1.07) (3.45) (2.51) (1.54) 
TD 0.407*** 0.442*** 0.019 0.058*** 0.093*** 0.025  
(5.89) (6.36) (0.57) (4.11) (3.21) (1.05) 
Inv 0.261*** 0.397*** 0.047* 0.027 0.021 0.005  
(8.41) (11.59) (1.83) (1.25) (1.45) (0.58) 
CR 0.006** 0.005** 0.006* 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.012*  
(2.41) (2.06) (1.81) (2.89) (3.17) (1.75) 
Inv*Classical 0.163*** 0.270*** 0.228 0.010* 0.022** 0.012  
(3.30) (5.71) (0.90) (1.79) (2.44) (1.02) 
Inv*TD 0.339*** 0.311*** 0.098 0.029** 0.032** 0.007  
(2.95) (2.97) (0.73) (2.50) (2.12) (1.59) 
CR*Classical 0.040*** 0.022*** 0.017 0.012** 0.006 0.010  
(4.66) (2.68) (1.09) (2.51) (1.51) (0.08) 
CR*TD 0.131*** 0.221*** 0.202*** 0.060*** 0.042*** 0.003*  
(6.49) (9.49) (11.22) (5.33) (4.56) (1.69) 
Leverage 0.849*** 0.484*** 0.576*** 
   
 
(7.11) (5.80) (8.57) 
   
Maturity 
   
0.298*** 0.305*** 0.102**     
(6.52) (5.21) (2.47) 
MB -0.015*** -0.013*** -0.002 -0.023*** -0.015*** -0.521*  
(-5.15) (-5.80) (-1.05) (-3.66) (-2.99) (-1.85) 
Size 0.031*** 0.013*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.012** 0.002**  
(8.55) (9.64) (2.96) (2.91) (1.95) (1.99) 
AB -0.004 -0.005** -0.001 
   
 
(-1.53) (-2.40) (-1.33) 
   
TS 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.001 
   
 
(3.20) (3.88) (0.97) 
   
AM 0.052*** 0.045*** 0.074***    
 (3.25) (5.20) (6.32)    
ROA    -0.130*** -0.155*** -0.085** 
    (-4.71) (-3.65) (-1.99) 
Tg 
   
0.062*** 0.054*** 0.010*     
(3.27) (4.02) (1.78) 
Zscore 0.022***   0.050***  
 
 
(10.39)   (25.56)  
 
WW index -0.010** -0.012* -0.002 -0.008*** -0.009** 0.001  
(-2.18) (-1.75) (-0.54) (-2.58) (-2.11) (1.25) 
Dividends 0.119*** 0.039*** -0.043*** 0.005* 0.009** 0.003  
(12.64) (4.66) (-6.03) (1.69) (2.02) (1.32) 
Ind. Med 0.003*** 0.038*** 0.025*** 0.018*** 0.010*** 0.010** 
 (10.84) (10.13) (7.84) (4.25) (4.99) (2.42) 
Bank Dep. 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.008* 0.002* 0.000  
(5.76) (9.56) (10.21) (-1.71) (1.82) (1.58) 
Bank Cred. 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.001*** 0.004*** 0.009*** 0.001***  
(5.05) (5.84) (8.35) (5.72) (5.72) (2.65) 
Ins. Prem. -0.004*** -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.005** -0.001* -0.000  
(-6.44)       (-10.96) (-10.23) (-2.09) (1.85) (1.25) 
Bond Cap. 0.005** 0.001** -0.000 0.009*** 0.002*** 0.000  
(2.14) (2.18) (-0.15) (2.70) (2.62) (1.47) 
Inter. Debt 0.011*** 0.015*** 0.010*** 0.005*** 0.009*** 0.002*  
(6.93) (5.02) (5.61) (3.26) (3.26) (1.81) 
Stock Traded 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.005*** 0.011** 0.007** 0.002  
(2.62) (7.68) (2.76) (2.05) (1.95) (0.45) 
Inflation -0.005*** -0.003** -0.002** -0.001* -0.001* 0.000  
(-3.78) (-2.26) (-2.37) (-1.75) (-1.82) (1.54) 
Savings 0.002 0.001*** 0.005 0.001** 0.002** 0.001  
(0.53) (2.99) (1.55) (2.56) (2.25) (1.58) 
Constant 0.047* 0.046** 0.072 0.154*** 0.135*** 0.147**  
(1.74) (2.21) (1.04) (3.25) (4.64) (1.98) 
N 199,513 125,859 73,654 199,513 125,859 73,654 
The table presents the results of the two equations estimated simultaneously (Equations. 1 and 2). The system is estimated by GMM 
regression approach in which standard errors are clustered the firm level (following Billett et al., 2007). The two dependent variables 
for which we report the results are Maturity, defined as long-term debt over total debt, and Leverage, defined as long-term debt over 
long-term debt plus book value of equity. We use Z-score to measure financial distress and consider firms with Z values below 1.80 
to be financially distressed. The remaining variables are defined in Appendix 1. Year dummies are included in all regressions, but not 
reported for brevity. The t-statistics are in parentheses.*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4: Changes in Maturity and Leverage 
 Maturity: Long-term debt/ total debt Leverage: (Long-term debt/ long-term debt +book value of equity) 
 All marginal Healthy marginal Distressed marginal All marginal Healthy marginal Distressed marginal 
1=increased long-term debt maturity, 0=decreased long-term debt maturity 
Classical 0.060*** 0.020*** 0.154** 0.040*** 0.037 0.024 0.230** 0.207*** 0.492*** 0.224*** 0.316 0.123 
 (3.74) (2.60) (2.41) (2.90) (0.28) (0.46) (2.19) (5.24) (3.91) (4.94) (1.58) (1.56) 
TD 0.211*** 0.101** 0.286*** 0.150*** 0.511 0.347 1.363*** 0.327*** 0.873*** 0.252** 1.977* 0.421 
 (2.96) (2.05) (3.00) (3.24) (1.31) (0.98) (5.27) (3.25) (2.87) (2.24) (1.91) (1.00) 
Inv 0.016 0.061 0.267** 0.094*** 0.169 0.045 0.670*** 0.084 0.514*** 0.069 -0.703 -0.179 
 (0.18) (1.62) (2.18) (2.80) (1.19) (0.75) (6.46) (.48) (3.83) (1.48) (-0.12) (-1.21) 
CR 0.031 0.000 0.039* 0.013*** 0.015 0.010 0.012 0.010 0.048** 0.030*** 0.043 0.039 
 (1.03) (0.02) (1.94) (2.60) (0.60) (1.01) (0.68) (1.53) (2.25) (3.85) (1.51) (0.83) 
Inv*Classical 0.163** 0.019** 0.267*** 0.036** 0.133 0.032 0.598*** 0.003** 0.785*** 0.050** 0.048 0.054 
 (2.22) (2.03) (3.49) (2.49) (0.62) (0.97) (3.34) (2.14) (3.59) (2.25) (0.15) (1.31) 
Inv*TD 0.588*** 0.033*** 0.268** 0.112*** 1.363* 0.020 1.969*** 0.134*** 1.773*** 0.083*** 2.012** 0.167*** 
 (5.53) (3.47) (2.55) (3.69) (1.93) (0.58) (4.33) (5.83) (3.28) (2.97) (2.27) (4.10) 
CR*Classical 0.021 0.003 0.063* 0.021 -0.018 -0.019 0.030*** 0.093*** 0.119*** 0.141*** 0.149*** 0.030 
 (0.84) (0.13) (1.87) (0.78) (-0.45) (-0.58) (2.99) (4.05) (3.18) (5.57) (2.62) (0.63) 
CR*TD 0.045 0.016 0.096 0.133 0.115 0.127 0.139*** 0.250*** 0.092* 0.121* 0.473* 0.432 
 (0.59) (0.29) (0.99) (0.89) (0.87) (1.31) (2.56) (4.38) (1.87) (1.91) (1.77) (1.61) 
Leverage 0.449*** 0.102*** 0.958*** 0.2208*** 0.386*** 0.088***       
 (18.02) (16.61) (19.36) (18.23) (12.00) (11.07)       
Maturity       1.632*** 0.417*** 1.528*** 0.371*** 1.860*** 0.483*** 
       (8.55) (8.79) (5.18) (5.25) (7.21) (4.91) 
MB -0.006 -0.002 -0.042*** -0.010*** 0.010 0.003 -0.048*** -0.006*** -0.101*** -0.019*** -0.034*** -0.004 
 (-1.26) (-1.36) (-6.06) (-5.76) (1.24) (1.36) (-8.56) (-5.20) (-14.08) (-12.54) (-3.36) (-1.60) 
Size 0.001 0.083 0.0080 0.087 0.011*** 0.323*** 0.034*** 0.065 0.028*** 0.079 0.084*** 0.085*** 
 (0.22) (1.47) (1.24) (0.93) (3.21) (3.87) (7.44) (0.65) (4.97) (0.67) (10.64) (5.79) 
AB -0.000 -0.000 -0.007 0.002 0.000 -0.000       
 (-1.19) (-0.89) (-0.57) (0.61) (0.31) (-1.06)       
TS 0.017** 0.459** 0.007 0.242 0.027** 0.702**       
 (2.31) (2.54) (0.71) (1.02) (2.24) (2.39)       
AM 0.152*** 0.071** 0.158*** 0.105** 0.102 0.087       
 (3.28) (2.51) (5.21) (2.12) (1.07) (1.52)       
ROA       -0.850*** -0.032*** -1.270*** -0.084*** -0.794*** -0.068*** 
       (-9.18) (-8.78) (-10.26) (-10.22) (-5.60) (-5.66) 
Tg       0.072 0.255* 0.167** 0.564** 0.020 0.803 
       (1.27) (1.89) (2.26) (2.43) (0.20) (0.88) 
Zscore 0.017*** 0.004***     0.134*** 0.033***     
 (5.79) (5.00)     (27.83) (31.50)     
WW index -0.005 -0.012*** -0.008 -0.010* -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.052*** -0.014*** -0.025*** -0.051*** -0.012*** -0.008*** 
 (-1.05) (-2.80) (-0.97) (-1.79) (-2.48) (-3.00) (-7.27) (-7.25) (-6.17) (-6.14) (-4.29) (-4.14) 
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Dividends 0.053*** 0.009** 0.041** 0.006** -0.087*** -0.017*** 0.248*** 0.055*** 0.293*** 0.059*** 0.207*** 0.056*** 
 (3.59) (2.57) (1.97) (2.18) (-3.83) (-3.09) (12.48) (12.98) (11.73) (12.05) (6.18) (6.99) 
Ind. Med 0.007 0.002 0.003 0.001 -0.017** -0.004** 0.044*** 0.013** 0.044*** 0.012*** 0.051*** 0.016*** 
 (1.27) (1.21) (0.34) (0.62) (-2.28) (-2.34) (6.59) (2.58) (5.21) (5.24) (4.64) (3.58) 
Bank Dep. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (1.34) (1.54) (0.71) (0.72) (1.00) (1.21) (0.27) (0.25) (0.91) (0.91) (0.44) (0.96) 
Bank Cred. 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.005*** 0.000* 0.001** -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (3.70) (4.26) (3.41) (3.72) (1.70) (2.04) (-0.88) (-1.34) (0.33) (0.86) (0.10) (1.55) 
Ins. Prem. 0.004 0.000 0.012*** 0.004*** -0.019*** -0.004*** 0.035*** 0.009*** 0.027*** 0.006*** 0.039*** 0.011*** 
 (1.51) (0.26) (2.95) (3.73) (-3.87) (-3.23) (9.48) (10.77) (6.04) (6.88) (5.90) (6.82) 
Bond Cap. 0.000 0.000 -0.001** -0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 
 (0.43) (1.29) (-2.09) (-2.95) (0.51) (0.84) (6.30) (10.34) (5.42) (7.92) (3.03) (6.73) 
Inter. Debt 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.003*** 0.000*** -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.002*** 0.000 
 (0.01) (0.07) (0.59) (0.95) (0.94) (1.15) (-8.34) (-5.32) (-7.19) (-5.03) (-4.07) (-1.64) 
Stock Traded 0.003*** 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.001*** 0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000** -0.001*** -0.000*** 
 (2.65) (1.73) (0.62) (1.24) (3.43) (3.05) (-4.42) (-4.96) (-2.14) (-2.16) (-2.41) (-3.10) 
Inflation 0.013** 0.003** 0.001 0.000 0.014* 0.003* -0.053*** -0.008*** 0.046*** 0.006*** -0.071*** -0.014*** 
 (2.46) (2.49) (0.17) (0.03) (1.78) (1.72) (-7.11) (-4.59) (4.97) (2.88) (-5.50) (-4.56) 
Savings 0.001 0.000 0.003** 0.001** -0.002 -0.000 0.002* 0.001*** 0.002 0.001* 0.002 0.001** 
 (1.05) (0.94) (1.89) (1.80) (-0.88) (-0.86) (1.84) (2.80) (1.37) (1.72) (0.94) (2.20) 
Constant -0.119*  0.380***  0.008  -0.979***  -1.170***  -0.407**  
 (-1.83)  (4.07)  (0.08)  (-9.08)  (-8.59)  (-2.17)  
1=increased long-term debt maturity, 0=Maintained long-term debt maturity 
Classical 2.272*** 0.041*** 1.999*** 0.050*** 1.600* 0.017* 2.320*** 0.208*** 2.115*** 0.195*** 3.175*** 0.229*** 
 (4.96) (4.81) (3.41) (3.69) (1.81) (1.71) (9.18) (10.36) (7.14) (8.21) (6.15) (6.51) 
TD 5.031*** 0.088*** 7.281*** 0.168*** 1.120 0.020 3.837*** 0.252*** 4.500*** 0.320*** 2.204 0.088 
 (3.41) (3.22) (4.41) (4.35) (0.40) (0.65) (5.57) (4.60) (5.49) (4.86) (1.52) (0.88) 
CR 0.582*** 0.011*** 0.130* 0.004** 1.009 0.011 0.113** 0.010** 0.176*** 0.018*** -0.059 -0.009 
 (4.07) (4.17) (1.86) (2.08) (1.48) (0.04) (2.26) (2.54) (3.08) (3.84) (-0.53) (-1.20) 
Inv 0.252*** 0.050*** 0.395*** 0.085*** 0.161* 0.088 0.142*** 0.025*** 0.129*** 0.029*** 0.129** 0.077*** 
 (4.43) (4.78) (5.39) (5.19) (1.67) (0.79) (5.10) (5.02) (3.94) (3.49) (2.42) (2.89) 
Inv*Classical 0.882*** 0.017*** 1.100*** 0.025*** -0.559 -0.007 1.099*** 0.085*** 1.103*** 0.093*** 1.823*** 0.114*** 
 (2.89) (2.97) (3.01) (2.92) (-1.02) (-1.10) (7.98) (7.72) (6.94) (7.19) (6.23) (5.69) 
Inv*TD 4.040*** 0.075*** 4.113*** 0.094*** 3.959*** 0.043*** 0.555*** 0.024* 0.928*** 0.062*** 0.187 0.011 
 (10.78) (10.90) (8.25) (8.14) (6.30) (6.28) (3.53) (1.94) (4.94) (4.08) (0.64) (0.54) 
CR*Classical 1.812*** 0.035*** 1.281*** 0.033*** 1.744*** 0.021*** 1.275*** 0.117*** 1.349*** 0.132*** 1.320*** 0.086*** 
 (6.22) (5.47) (3.59) (3.58) (3.19) (2.91) (8.17) (8.24) (7.34) (7.59) (4.12) (3.55) 
CR*TD 4.009*** 0.072*** 5.492*** 0.126*** 0.104 0.002 1.866*** 0.110*** 2.333*** 0.167*** 1.645** 0.049 
 (5.94) (5.71) (7.03) (6.90) (0.07) (0.11) (4.73) (3.49) (4.81) (4.27) (2.05) (0.90) 
Leverage 1.107*** 0.016*** 0.644*** 0.026*** 1.473*** 0.014***       
 (15.87) (12.82) (5.62) (9.96) (14.20) (10.66)       
Maturity       1.526*** 0.175*** 1.722*** 0.183*** 0.657*** 0.112*** 
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       (6.60) (4.37) (5.74) (9.28) (8.07) (9.49) 
MB -0.011* -0.000** -0.017** -0.001** 0.039* -0.000** -0.142*** -0.010*** -0.099*** -0.005*** 0.126*** 0.008*** 
 (-1.92) (-2.20) (-2.06) (-2.36) (1.79) (2.09) (-18.44) (-16.45) (-9.78) (-6.56) (9.31) (8.62) 
Size 0.076*** 0.142*** 0.097*** 0.239*** 0.095*** 0.113*** 0.268*** 0.021*** 0.248*** 1.953*** 0.284** 1.740 
 (10.16) (10.46) (9.05) (9.67) (7.25) (7.15) (5.40) (4.17) (7.53) (6.53) (2.32) (1.17) 
AB -0.003 -0.000 -0.014 -0.000 0.004 0.000       
 (-1.06) (-0.70) (-1.40) (-1.33) (1.20) (1.22)       
TS 0.038* 0.009** 0.067*** 0.015*** 0.070* 0.009**       
 (1.87) (2.32) (2.69) (2.60) (1.84) (2.20)       
AM 0.110*** 0.082** 0.085*** 0.125** 0.012** 0.071*       
 (2.88) (1.98) (3.22) (2.20) (1.99) (1.74)       
ROA       -0.929*** 0-.010*** -1.119*** -0.007*** -0.756*** -0.006*** 
       (-9.06) (-7.66) (-9.25) (-8.05) (-5.13) (-4.51) 
Tg       0.228** 0.007*** 0.080 0.009 0.391*** 0.086*** 
       (2.53) (2.87) (0.68) (1.14) (2.75) (2.93) 
Zscore 0.065*** 0.001***     0.075*** 0.010***     
 (7.36) (6.37)     (12.51) (21.80)     
WW index -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.000** -0.002** -0.000* -0.001** -0.000* -0.002** 0.000 0.000 
 (-3.85) (-3.99) (-6.28) (-6.54) (-1.95) (-2.06) (-1.92) (-2.46) (-1.73) (-2.11) (0.63) (1.07) 
Dividends 0.401*** 0.007*** 0.298*** 0.008*** 0.723 0.008 0.009** 0.007*** 0.056 0.003 0.125** 0.016 
 (9.12) (7.86) (5.72) (5.82) (0.66) (0.46) (2.31) (3.05) (1.58) (1.11) (2.37) (1.47) 
Ind. Med 0.011 0.000 0.045** 0.001** 0.013 0.000 0.106*** 0.010*** 0.116*** 0.011*** 0.093*** 0.008*** 
 (0.79) (0.56) (2.36) (2.34) (0.65) (1.06) (8.52) (10.08) (7.47) (8.54) (4.54) (5.98) 
Bank Dep. 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003** 0.012*** 0.009*** 0.001*** 0.009*** 0.001*** 0.010*** 0.001*** 
 (1.34) (1.55) (0.26) (0.15) (2.49) (2.81) (24.76) (25.88) (20.42) (21.22) (12.37) (13.28) 
Bank Cred. 0.002*** 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.004*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.001*** 
 (9.11) (10.26) (5.43) (4.98) (8.06) (9.89) (7.73) (8.15) (2.53) (2.62) (8.09) (9.35) 
Ins. Prem. 0.099 0.002 0.072 0.002 0.144 0.002 0.029 0.003 0.026 0.003 -0.032 -0.004 
 (1.55) (1.85) (1.18) (0.71) (0.19) (0.10) (1.12) (1.53) (0.86) (0.25) (-1.63) (-1.33) 
Bond Cap. 0.004*** 0.014*** 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.004 0.000 0.009*** 0.001*** 0.007*** 0.001*** 0.014*** 0.001*** 
 (7.03) (7.01) (6.57) (6.24) (1.17) (0.90) (19.13) (21.62) (13.17) (14.87) (14.90) (17.11) 
Inter. Debt 0.000 0.000 0.003*** 0.000*** 0.004 0.000 0.009*** 0.001*** 0.008*** 0.001*** 0.011*** 0.001*** 
 (0.58) (0.59) (3.21) (3.15) (0.42) (0.60) (15.08) (13.24) (12.08) (10.52) (10.06) (9.33) 
Stock Traded 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.0001*** 0.004*** 0.000* 0.001** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
 (9.91) (9.27) (5.52) (5.52) (5.87) (1.85) (2.13) (3.28) (0.05) (0.44) (1.44) (1.23) 
Inflation 0.000 0.000 0.023 0.001 0.028 0.000 0.142 0.010 0.153 0.011 0.101 0.005 
 (0.02) (0.40) (1.12) (1.17) (1.00) (0.76) (1.09) (1.54) (0.90) (0.89) (1.41) (0.99) 
Savings 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.000 0.008*** 0.001*** 0.004* 0.000** 0.018 0.001 
 (1.35) (1.17) (0.30) (0.69) (-0.44) (-0.30) (4.40) (5.01) (1.72) (2.08) (0.34) (0.98) 
Constant -5.476***  -5.412***  -5.600***  1.250  1.831***  2.562***  
 (-25.27)  (-18.53)  (-14.47)  (1.00)  (8.87)  (8.42)  
N 199,513  116,544  82,969  202,595  128,038  74,557  
Pseudo R2 0.07  0.09  0.06  0.11  0.11  0.07  
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This table presents the results for Equations (3) and (4) showing the likelihood of increasing debt maturity, Maturity, which is defined as long-term debt over total debt, and leverage,  Leverage, 
which is defined as long-term debt over long-term debt plus book value of equity. Following Rivers and Vuong (1988) methodology, we use a two-stage estimation procedure. In the first stage, 
we replace the endogenous variables with their predicted values to control for endogeneity (Wooldridge, 2002). We follow Dang (2011) to select the instruments for the exogenous variables in 
our model. Considering Equation (3), we use non-debt tax shields, measured by depreciation over total assets, and tangibility as the instruments for leverage as they are not theoretically related to 
debt maturity (Dang, 2011; Johnson, 2003). With regard to Equation (4), following Dang (2011) who uses only asset maturity and term structure of interest rates as instrumental values for debt 
maturity (other variables, tax ratio, growth opportunities, and firm quality, are potentially correlated with leverage, e.g., Frank and Goyal, 2009), we use asset maturity (AM) and term structure of 
interest rates (TS) as instruments for debt maturity in Equation (4). The results of the second stage are only reported for brevity. We use Z-score to measure financial distress and consider firms 
with Z values below 1.80 to be financially distressed. The remaining variables are defined in Appendix 1. Year dummies are included in all regressions, but not reported for brevity. The t-statistics 
are in parentheses.*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5: Robustness Checks 
 Maturity: Long-term debt/ total debt Leverage: (Long-term debt/ long-term debt +book value of 
equity) 
 All Healthy Distressed     All Healthy Distressed 
Panel A: anti-directors rights from Spamann (2010) 
Inv*Classical 
 
Inv*TD 
 
CR* Classical 
 
CR*TD 
 
CR 
 
Inv 
 
Classical 
 
TD 
 
Zscore 
 
 
Controls 
0.124*** 
(3.51) 
0.264*** 
(4.21) 
0.036** 
(2.28) 
0.152*** 
(3.42) 
0.010*** 
(2.99) 
0.198** 
(4.25) 
0.152*** 
(6.15) 
0.302*** 
(2.88) 
0.019*** 
(3.99) 
 
Yes 
0.187*** 
(4.05) 
0.158*** 
(3.58) 
0.018*** 
(3.62) 
0.159* 
(1.93) 
0.008** 
(1.98) 
0.225*** 
(3.21) 
0.168 
(0.03) 
0.312*** 
(3.55) 
 
 
 
Yes 
0.102 
(0.87) 
0.045 
(1.52) 
0.002 
(1.02) 
0.105* 
(1.86) 
0.001* 
(1.68) 
0.022* 
(1.78) 
0.020*** 
(4.18) 
0.050 
(1.12) 
 
 
 
Yes 
0.425** 
(2.54) 
0.019*** 
(2.88) 
0.020** 
(1.98) 
0.052** 
(2.25) 
0.017*** 
(3.45) 
0.035*** 
(3.02) 
0.065*** 
(2.66) 
0.066* 
(1.88) 
0.035*** 
(5.04) 
 
Yes 
0.058** 
(1.99) 
0.025* 
(1.78) 
0.025* 
(1.78) 
0.031** 
(2.00) 
0.010*** 
(3.57) 
0.098** 
(2.14) 
0.045** 
(2.52) 
0.075** 
(2.05) 
 
 
 
Yes 
0.017 
(1.48) 
0.015 
(1.11) 
0.012 
(0.85) 
0.005* 
(1.92) 
0.001 
(1.52) 
0.020 
(0.86) 
0.023 
(1.05) 
0.023 
(1.28) 
 
 
 
Yes 
N 199,513 125,859 73,654 199,513 125,859 73,654 
Panel B: Mehran and Prestiani’s (2010) and Bharath and Dittmar’s (2010) hazard rate 
Inv*Classical 
 
Inv*TD 
 
CR* Classical 
 
CR*TD 
 
CR 
 
Inv 
 
Classical 
 
TD 
 
Hazard 
 
 
Controls 
0.124*** 
(4.25) 
0.232*** 
(2.99) 
0.025*** 
(2.78) 
0.098*** 
(4.65) 
0.004** 
(2.22) 
0.250**** 
(3.56) 
0.099*** 
(2.98) 
0.357*** 
(5.45) 
0.031*** 
(3.45) 
 
Yes 
0.145*** 
(4.21) 
0.200** 
(2.32) 
0.003*** 
(2.76) 
0.119* 
(1.78) 
0.004** 
(2.12) 
0.241*** 
(5.02) 
0.100*** 
(2.81) 
0.241*** 
(2.99) 
 
 
 
Yes 
0.142 
(1.00) 
0.074 
(1.12) 
0.010 
(1.14) 
0.092* 
(1.94) 
0.003 
(0.75) 
0.041* 
(1.78) 
0.025 
(1.10) 
0.012 
(1.15) 
 
 
 
Yes 
0.012*** 
(2.97) 
0.014*** 
(3.54) 
0.010*** 
(4.18) 
0.041*** 
(4.23) 
0.011*** 
(5.32) 
0.030*** 
(6.54) 
0.056*** 
(4.12) 
0.040*** 
(2.98) 
0.030** 
(1.99) 
 
Yes 
0.015** 
(2.50) 
0.021** 
(2.45) 
0.012*** 
(4.87) 
0.040** 
(2.54) 
0.008* 
(1.78) 
0.012*** 
(4.87) 
0.052** 
(2.41) 
0.079*** 
(3.52) 
 
 
 
Yes 
0.009 
(1.02) 
0.003 
(0.81) 
-0.010 
(-1.20) 
0.002* 
(1.80) 
0.014* 
(1.78) 
0.003 
(1.21) 
0.006 
(1.62) 
0.014 
(1.09) 
 
 
 
Yes 
N 190,762 117,897 72,865 190,762 117,897 72,865 
 
Panel C: Hierarchical Linear Model (HLM) specification 
Inv*Classical 0.115* 0.085*** 0.105 0.325*** 0.203*** 0.482 
 (1.85) (2.89) (1.25) (5.89) (4.28) (1.05) 
Inv*TD 0.178** 0.182*** 0.059 0.025 0.081** 0.029 
 (2.41) (3.00) (1.33) (0.15) (1.98) (0.58) 
CR* Classical 0.007* 0.008 0.032 0.031*** 0.018* 0.058 
 (1.74) (0.45) (1.07) (3.58) (1.71) (1.19) 
CR*TD 0.107*** 0.148*** 0.058* 0.092*** 0.062*** 0.081*** 
 (4.15) (3.25) (1.80) (6.58) (2.58) (3.02) 
CR 0.061*** 0.030* 0.064* 0.005** 0.031** 0.025 
 (3.15) (1.81) (1.78) (2.40) (2.55) (1.11) 
Inv 0.049** 0.027* -0.108 0.026*** 0.012** -0.052 
 (2.53) (1.88) (-1.22) (3.85) (2.14) (-1.23) 
Classical 0.082 0.892 0.010 0.289*** 0.132*** 0.289 
 (0.15) (1.28) (0.07) (6.00) (2.88) (1.02) 
TD 0.005** 0.142*** 0.125 0.123*** 0.118*** 0.008 
 (2.05) (2.88) (1.02) (2.98) (3.02) (1.08) 
Zscore  0.029***   0.040***   
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 (3.78)   (3.52)   
       
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 199,513 125,859 73,654 199,513 125,859 73,654 
Panel D: Omitted variables (1) 
Inv*Classical 0.374*** 0.355*** 0.310 0.167*** 0.147** 0.153 
 
(6.33) (11.88) (0.93) (3.46) (2.33) (1.04) 
Inv*TD 0.657*** 0.722*** 0.244 1.117*** 1.183*** 0.769* 
 
(10.88) (9.52) (1.48) (10.15) (7.90) (1.74) 
CR* Classical 0.023*** 0.027*** 0.017 0.022*** 0.012** 0.029 
 
(7.25) (6.48) (1.59) (2.72) (2.08) (1.45) 
CR*TD 0.052*** 0.045*** 0.054*** 0.003** 0.068** 0.041 
 
(4.28) (2.95) (2.79) (2.14) (2.35) (1.36) 
CR 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.017* 0.010*** 0.019*** 0.001 
 
(7.26) (5.23) (1.85) (3.03) (4.12) (0.23) 
Inv 0.283*** 0.284*** 0.251** 0.030 0.029 0.085 
 
(3.29) (7.06) (2.18) (0.88) (0.66) (1.64) 
Classical 0.172*** 0.170*** 0.140 0.005** 0.027*** 0.023 
 
(5.10) (8.46) (1.01) (2.17) (2.68) (0.52) 
TD 0.345*** 0.372*** 0.149 0.528*** 0.455*** 0.413 
 
(11.89) (10.08) (1.18) (12.14) (7.85) (1.10) 
Zscore  0.009***   0.007***   
 
(14.18)   (10.06)   
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 101,373 61,996 39,377 102,650 62,884 39,766 
Panel E: Omitted variables (2) 
Inv*Classical 0.313*** 0.199*** 0.338 0.504*** 0.457*** 0.494 
 (8.05) (10.51) (1.29) (4.11) (11.40) (1.04) 
Inv*TD 0.534*** 0.347*** 0.469 0.954*** 0.754*** 1.014* 
 (11.68) (7.22) (1.49) (11.68) (7.90) (1.79) 
CR* Classical 0.034*** 0.020*** 0.047 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.039 
 (14.03) (7.60) (1.47) (5.88) (4.97) (0.98) 
CR*TD 0.079*** 0.067*** 0.072** 0.024** 0.019** 0.001 
 (8.56) (6.96) (2.29) (2.52) (2.03) (0.06) 
CR 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.009 0.020*** 0.007*** 0.037 
 (9.04) (8.33) (1.51) (7.96) (2.61) (1.13) 
Inv 0.140*** 0.103*** 0.158* 0.195*** 0.197*** 0.063 
 (14.70) (9.92) (1.69) (7.94) (7.05) (1.50) 
Classical 0.175*** 0.104*** 0.202* 0.216*** 0.215*** 0.205 
 (15.77) (11.26) (1.82) (9.76) (8.39) (1.54) 
TD 0.134*** 0.058** 0.145 0.516*** 0.403*** 0.517 
 (6.17) (2.49) (1.63) (16.43) (11.17) (1.57) 
Zscore  0.029***   0.029***   
 (5.82)   (7.64)   
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 41,885 24,866 17,019 41,885 24,866 17,019 
Panel F: Excluding the US 
Inv*Classical 0.614*** 0.566*** 0.563 0.086*** 0.030* 0.086 
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 (3.19) (2.76) (0.96) (5.76) (1.81) (1.46) 
Inv*TD 0.959*** 0.959*** 0.418 0.281*** 0.041* 0.123 
 (9.52) (5.46) (1.19) (7.23) (1.91) (1.65) 
CR* Classical 0.004** (0.004)** -0.003 0.020*** 0.022*** 0.037 
 (2.46) (2.16) (-0.62) (9.16) (9.11) (0.93) 
CR*TD 0.032** 0.027** 0.077*** 0.073*** 0.066*** 0.028* 
 (3.16) (2.06) (4.69) (9.06) (7.67) (1.88) 
CR 0.029*** 0.026*** 0.022*** 0.003** 0.003* 0.005** 
 (7.48) (5.60) (8.87) (2.53) (1.82) (2.37) 
Inv 0.445*** 0.402*** 0.392 0.122*** 0.031*** 0.105** 
 (5.51) (3.34) (0.96) (5.49) (3.48) (2.04) 
Classical 0.228*** 0.214*** 0.223* 0.065*** 0.043*** 0.082* 
 (24.98) (17.55) (1.70) (8.90) (5.26) (1.68) 
TD 0.447*** 0.433*** 0.263 0.051*** 0.069*** 0.073 
 (9.09) (4.35) (1.11) (2.74) (3.45) (1.14) 
Zscore  0.009***   0.026***   
 (8.19)   (5.22)   
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 163,240 100,625 62,615 166,102 102,625 63,477 
This table reports robustness checks. Panels A report the results for the system of Equations (1) and (2) when we use an 
alternative measure for investor protection, namely the revised measure of anti-directors’ rights from Spamann (2010) and 
classify countries into strong (weak) investor protections if its anti-directors rights are above (below) the mean anti-directors 
rights of the sample. Panel B reports the system of Equations (1) and (2) results when we use the Mehran and Prestiani’s (2010) 
and Bharath and Dittmar’s (2010) hazard rate using Equation (5). We classify companies into healthy (distressed) if the hazard 
rate is below (above) the sample mean. Panel C reports the results for the system of Equations (1) and (2) when we estimate 
the hierarchical linear model (HLM) specification using Equations (7) and (8) where, for firm-level variables, we consider 
firm-level deviations and country-level means. For country-level variables, we consider grand-mean centred country-level 
deviations. Panels D and E report the system of Equations (1) and (2) results when we add additional firm- and country-level 
controls (Zheng et al., 2012). In Panel D, we add Private Credit, GINI index, and Governance Control. In Panel E, we also 
added two additional variables to our estimation in Panel D, the ultimate cash flow rights of the largest shareholders (Cash 
flow rights) to proxy for the alignment effect and the ultimate voting rights minus ultimate cash flow rights of the largest 
shareholders (Diverge) to proxy for internment effect. We report these results separately as these two additional variables have 
reduced the sample size significantly. Panel F reports the system of Equations (1) and (2) results when we exclude the US 
from our sample. The system of Equations in Panels A, B, D, E, and F are estimated by GMM regression approach in which 
standard errors are clustered at the firm level (following Billett et al., 2007) Year dummies are included in all regressions, but 
not reported for brevity. We define the variables in Appendix 1. The t-statistics are in parentheses.*, **, and *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  
43 
 
Appendix 1: Definitions of Variables 
Variables  Description Source 
Panel A: Firm-level control variables 
Maturity Long-term debt/ Total debt DataStream 
Leverage Long-term debt/ Long-term debt + Book value of equity DataStream 
Inv The score of anti-self-dealing index. The higher the score, the 
higher the level of investor protection 
Djankov et al. (2008) 
CR Creditor rights index Djankov et al. (2007) 
Classical  A dummy variable equal to one if the firm located in a country 
that adopts classical tax system 
Alzahrani and Lasfer (2012), OECD tax 
database 
TD Tax discrimination based on Miller (1977), computed as =1-[(1-
stautory corporate tax)*(1-highest effective personal tax rate on 
equity)/(1-highest statutory personal tax rate on interest)] 
OECD tax database 
www.oecd.org/ctp/taxdatabase World’s 
Highest Marginal Tax Rate on Global 
Finance website 
MB Market to book ratio DataStream 
Size Log of market capitalisation DataStream 
AB Abnormal earnings = (EPSt+1 - EPSt)/ SPt DataStream 
ROA Return on assets = EBIT/Total Assets DataStream 
AM Asset Maturity = PPE/ Depreciation DataStream 
Tg Tangibility= Fixed Assets/ Total Assets DataStream 
Z-score 1.2*(working capital/total assets)+1.4*(retained earnings/total 
assets)+3.3*(earnings before interest and taxes/total 
assets)+0.6*(market value of equity/ book value of total 
liabilities)+0.999*(sales/total assets) 
Eisdorfer (2008) and DataStream 
WW index We follow Whited and Wu (2006) and compute WW index as: -
0.091Cash Flow-0.062Div+0.021LTDTD-0.044Size-0.0102ISG-
0.035SG, where WW-Cash Flow is operating income plus 
depreciation divided by beginning-of-period total assets. WW-Div 
is an indicator equal to one if the firm pays cash dividend. WW-
LTDTD is the ratio of long-term debt over total assets. WW-Size 
is the natural logarithm of total assets. WW-ISG is the firm’s 3-
digit industry sales growth. WW-SG is firm sales growth 
DataStream 
Dividends A dummy variable equal to 1 if firm pays dividends, 0 otherwise DataStream 
Ind. Med Yearly industry median of debt maturity DataStream 
Panel B: Country-level control variables 
TS Term structure = BY10y – BY3m where BY is treasury bill or 
interbank rate if data not available 
DataStream 
Bank Dep. Bank deposits to GDP World Bank, FSD 
Bank Credit Bank credit to bank deposits  World Bank, FSD 
Ins. Prem. Life and non-life insurance premium volume to GDP World Bank, FSD 
Bond Cap. Public and private bond market capitalisation to GDP World Bank, FSD 
Inter. Debt International debt issues to GDP World Bank, FSD 
Loans Loans from non-resident banks to GDP World Bank, FSD 
Stock Traded Total value of stock traded to GDP Economic and Social Data Service, 
International Financial Statistics 
Inflation Annual rate of change on consumer price index Economic and Social Data Service, 
International Financial Statistics 
Savings Gross domestic saving to GDP Economic and Social Data Service, 
International Financial Statistics 
Panel C: Variables for Robustness Checks 
Cash flow rights Ultimate cash flow rights of the largest shareholder, as a 
percentage of total outstanding shares (at the 10% cut-off) 
Zheng et al. (2012), Faccio and Lang (2002) 
Diverge Ultimate voting rights minus ultimate cash flow rights of the 
largest shareholder (at 10% cut-off) 
Zheng et al. (2012), Faccio and Lang (2002) 
Private Credit The ratio of private credit by deposit money banks to the sum of 
private bond market capitalization and public bond market 
capitalization 
Zheng et al. (2012), World Bank, FSD 
GINI GINI index Zheng et al. (2012), World Income Inequality 
Database  
Governance Control An index that captures perceptions of the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain. A higher value implies less 
corruption. 
World Governance Indicators (available over 
1996-2016), Kaufmann et al. (2008), Zheng 
et al. (2012) 
This table shows the definitions and data sources of firm-level control variables in Panel A, country-level control variables in 
Panel B, and robustness check variables in Panel C. FSD is for Financial Structure Database. All variables are measured in US 
dollars. 
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Appendix 2: Distribution of firm specific variables by governance and tax systems 
Country N Maturity Leverage Inv TD CR MB Size AB ROA AM Tg Zscore Dividends WW index Ind. Med 
Panel A: strong investor  protection countries 
            
1. Classical tax system 
              
Ireland 536 0.69 0.34 0.79 0.15 1.00 1.76 10.50 0.01 0.01 2.37 0.79 1.47 0.59 -0.55 0.62 
United States 36,493 0.64 0.27 0.65 0.24 1.00 1.73 8.41 -0.20 -0.04 1.61 0.84 1.68 0.25 -0.49 0.58 
2. Partial imputation tax system 
             
Canada 4,570 0.67 0.26 0.64 0.20 1.00 2.27 12.27 0.01 -0.01 0.46 0.88 2.86 0.47 -0.59 0.20 
Ireland 185 0.64 0.28 0.79 0.19 1.00 2.37 12.21 0.02 0.06 0.35 0.91 3.23 0.73 -0.57 0.28 
Kingdom 15,280 0.57 0.22 0.95 0.10 4.00 1.64 9.32 -0.04 0.01 2.07 0.82 1.63 0.59 -0.52 0.50 
3. Full imputation tax system 
              
Australia 47,876 0.60 0.24 0.76 0.00 3.00 1.57 9.32 -0.04 -0.02 2.41 0.85 1.44 0.45 -0.55 0.51 
Canada 13,314 0.62 0.25 0.64 0.03 1.00 0.26 4.80 -0.16 -0.01 6.80 0.89 -0.17 0.31 -0.44 0.78 
New Zealand 1,264 0.61 0.25 0.95 -0.01 4.00 1.47 9.36 0.01 0.03 2.61 0.87 1.52 0.72 -0.52 0.43 
Panel B: weak investor protection countries 
            
1. Classical tax system 
              
Austria 1,694 0.56 0.35 0.21 -0.06 3.00 1.43 10.33 0.01 0.04 1.77 0.91 1.67 0.68 -0.52 0.46 
Belgium 1,664 0.57 0.34 0.54 -0.12 2.00 1.71 10.42 0.01 0.04 1.33 0.86 1.82 0.66 -0.53 0.41 
Denmark 1,950 0.57 0.29 0.46 -0.02 3.00 1.56 9.99 0.00 0.03 1.44 0.89 2.33 0.59 -0.52 0.50 
Germany 4,128 0.59 0.37 0.28 0.02 3.00 0.83 7.71 -0.04 0.01 3.23 0.84 0.75 0.57 -0.43 0.46 
Japan 43,858 0.43 0.28 0.50 0.00 2.00 0.92 9.82 0.00 0.02 3.05 0.98 1.87 0.85 -0.49 0.13 
Netherlands 1,340 0.65 0.34 0.20 0.03 3.00 2.17 11.99 -0.15 0.06 1.22 0.83 2.14 0.71 -0.60 0.40 
Poland 3,909 0.45 0.19 0.29 -0.04 1.00 1.19 7.79 0.01 0.03 3.58 0.91 1.67 0.38 -0.42 0.43 
Portugal 633 0.57 0.43 0.44 0.06 1.00 1.40 10.28 0.01 0.03 0.59 0.82 0.73 0.67 -0.28 0.41 
Spain 1,218 0.58 0.39 0.37 0.00 2.00 1.18 9.96 -0.03 0.03 3.27 0.86 0.80 0.65 -0.51 0.75 
Sweden 3,977 0.59 0.24 0.33 -0.14 1.00 1.50 8.18 -0.04 -0.03 1.60 0.77 1.18 0.48 -0.46 0.45 
Switzerland 3,186 0.63 0.33 0.27 0.15 1.00 1.79 11.40 0.00 0.04 1.66 0.90 2.17 0.73 -0.56 0.38 
2. Partial imputation tax system 
             
Denmark 40 0.61 0.27 0.46 0.00 3.00 1.24 10.90 0.01 0.09 0.34 0.98 2.48 0.85 -0.53 0.20 
Finland 1,195 0.60 0.35 0.46 -0.15 1.00 1.36 9.56 0.00 0.04 2.03 0.81 1.38 0.76 -0.48 0.45 
France 6,484 0.58 0.33 0.38 0.12 0.00 1.19 8.63 0.01 0.09 1.94 0.81 1.21 0.56 -0.48 0.75 
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Germany 2,914 0.54 0.25 0.28 0.11 3.00 2.12 11.72 0.00 0.02 0.26 0.86 2.58 0.46 -0.55 0.01 
Italy 2,293 0.51 0.34 0.42 -0.10 2.00 1.24 9.95 -0.01 0.02 2.62 0.81 0.86 0.60 -0.48 0.63 
Luxembourg 303 0.61 0.32 0.28 0.05 1.00 1.43 9.88 0.00 0.06 2.50 0.85 1.19 0.63 -0.55 0.44 
Norway 63 0.80 0.43 0.42 -0.15 2.00 1.72 11.77 -0.01 -0.01 0.42 0.93 1.90 0.51 -0.57 0.45 
Portugal 139 0.57 0.43 0.44 0.07 1.00 1.99 12.04 0.03 0.03 0.35 0.81 1.13 0.63 -0.31 0.27 
Spain 862 0.51 0.26 0.37 0.11 2.00 2.37 12.96 0.01 0.08 0.36 0.92 2.41 0.74 -0.62 0.10 
Turkey 3,160 0.35 0.18 0.43 0.03 2.00 1.23 9.22 0.01 0.05 3.58 0.96 1.76 0.38 -0.43 0.34 
3. Full imputation tax system 
              
Finland 437 0.66 0.26 0.46 -0.15 1.00 2.08 11.84 0.00 0.06 0.31 0.89 3.22 0.80 -0.57 0.16 
France 4,286 0.54 0.27 0.38 0.13 0.00 2.39 11.84 -0.08 0.07 0.20 0.87 2.56 0.67 -0.58 0.04 
Italy 1,177 0.47 0.28 0.42 0.13 2.00 1.88 12.58 0.87 0.05 0.27 0.90 1.94 0.68 -0.57 0.04 
Mexico 1,496 0.65 0.27 0.17 0.00 0.00 1.29 11.54 -0.05 0.06 2.69 0.91 1.96 0.50 -0.53 0.39 
Norway 718 0.76 0.38 0.42 -0.04 2.00 2.12 11.89 0.01 0.04 0.40 0.92 2.35 0.56 -0.60 0.37 
                 
All strong 119,518 0.64 *** 0.29* 0.73*** 0.10*** 2.22*** 1.51*** 8.66*** -0.10*** -0.02*** 2.2***6 0.85*** 1.41*** 0.40*** -0.53* 0.55*** 
All weak 93,124 0.50 0.27 0.42 0.01 1.72 1.24 9.85 -0.47 0.03 2.44 0.92 1.77 0.71 -0.50 0.27 
All classical 104,586 0.65a,b 0.28 a,c 0.51 a,c 0.09 a,b,c 1.62 a,b 1.32 b 9.21 a,b,c -0.08 a,b 0.00 a,b 2.43 a,b 0.90 a,b 1.72 b,c 0.58 b -0.49 a,b 0.36 a,b,c 
All partial 37,488 0.56 0.26 0.65 0.07 2.38 1.63 9.90 -1.19 0.03 1.78 0.84 1.76 0.55 -0.52 0.45 
All full 70,568 0.54 0.24 0.69 0.02 2.36 1.38 8.76 -0.05 -0.01 2.57 0.86 1.24 0.45 -0.54 0.51 
All sample 212,642 0.58 0.28 0.60 0.06 2.00 1.39 9.18 -0.26 0.00 2.35 0.88 1.57 0.53 -0.51 0.43 
This table reports the distribution of firm-specific variables by governance and tax systems. The overall sample included 212,642 firm-year observations from 24 OECD countries from 1990 to 
2015. We follow Alzahrani and Lasfer (2012) and classify a country as strong (weak) investor protections if its anti-self-dealing index score, as reported by Djankov et al. (2008), is above (below) 
the mean anti-self-dealing index score of the sample. The remaining variables are defined in Appendix 1.  
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively between strong and weak protection. a, b, c significantly different at 1% level between Classical and Partial tax system, 
Classical and Full tax system, and between Full and Partial tax system, using two-tailed t-tests.  
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Appendix 3: Distribution of country-level variables by governance and tax systems 
Country TS Bank Dep. Bank Credit Ins. Prem. Bond Cap. Inter. Debt Stock Traded Inflation Savings 
Panel A: strong investor  protection countries 
     
1. Classical tax system 
       
Ireland 1.57 0.83 1.52 0.07 0.60 1.30 0.18 0.02 0.29 
United States 0.67 0.74 0.71 0.07 0.93 0.23 2.06 0.02 0.21 
2. Partial imputation tax system 
      
Canada 0.90 1.17 0.96 0.05 0.87 0.27 0.73 0.02 0.25 
Ireland 0.44 0.54 1.13 0.08 0.42 0.17 0.30 0.02 0.26 
Kingdom -0.96 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.33 0.75 1.18 0.02 0.20 
3. Full imputation tax system 
      
Australia 0.41 0.82 1.30 0.06 0.76 0.39 0.68 0.03 0.25 
Canada 1.17 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.92 0.42 0.75 0.01 0.22 
New Zealand 0.57 0.50 0.96 0.03 0.24 0.10 0.13 0.02 0.23 
Panel B: weak investor protection countries 
     
1. Classical tax system 
       
Austria 1.19 
        
Belgium 1.61 0.86 0.78 0.06 0.90 0.64 0.24 0.02 0.23 
Denmark 0.92 0.55 2.09 0.08 1.87 0.30 0.42 0.02 0.24 
Germany 1.19 0.93 0.99 0.05 0.34 0.66 0.44 0.01 0.24 
Japan 0.87 2.05 0.52 0.08 2.12 0.08 0.90 0.00 0.21 
Netherlands 1.17 0.92 1.91 0.06 0.73 1.03 0.98 0.02 0.24 
Poland 0.32 0.46 0.72 0.03 0.21 0.13 0.15 0.02 0.22 
Portugal 1.49 0.92 1.41 0.06 0.49 0.60 0.25 0.03 0.21 
Spain 1.83 1.11 1.40 0.04 0.46 0.80 0.87 0.02 0.21 
Sweden 1.10 0.51 1.69 0.07 0.79 0.73 1.23 0.01 0.25 
Switzerland 0.96 1.32 1.22 0.07 0.55 0.51 1.67 0.01 0.26 
2. Partial imputation tax system 
      
Denmark -0.05 0.52 0.96 0.05 1.52 0.00 0.15 0.03 0.24 
Finland 1.00 0.59 1.50 0.04 0.20 0.50 1.18 0.02 0.19 
France 1.55 0.75 1.34 0.09 0.56 0.63 0.68 0.01 0.21 
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Germany 0.90 0.97 1.14 0.05 0.81 0.74 0.70 0.02 0.21 
Italy 1.87 0.70 1.40 0.07 0.75 0.53 0.52 0.02 0.20 
Luxembourg 2.56 3.42 0.37 0.05 0.01 1.28 0.09 0.02 0.33 
Norway -1.18 0.47 1.45 0.05 0.34 0.22 0.31 0.03 0.17 
Portugal 1.63 0.83 1.61 0.07 0.60 0.57 0.18 0.03 0.24 
Spain 1.23 0.78 1.31 0.05 0.60 0.38 1.18 0.03 0.25 
Turkey 0.07 0.42 0.84 0.01 0.28 0.09 0.43 0.14 0.24 
3. Full imputation tax system 
      
Finland 1.45 0.47 1.27 0.04 0.46 0.36 1.31 0.02 0.27 
France 1.24 0.52 1.26 0.08 0.83 0.22 0.50 0.02 0.26 
Italy 1.06 0.50 1.34 0.05 1.17 0.18 0.36 0.03 0.23 
Mexico 1.81 0.24 0.77 0.02 0.30 0.12 0.14 0.08 0.21 
Norway 0.60 0.49 1.37 0.05 0.40 0.09 0.35 0.02 0.24 
          
All strong 0.42*** 0.61*** 0.79** 0.07 0.77*** 0.38** 1.17*** 0.02 0.23 
All weak 1.01 1.35 0.90 0.07 1.32 0.29 0.76 0.01 0.22 
All classical 0.84 a,b,c 1.30 a,b 0.76b,c 0.07 1.34 a,b,c 0.24 a,b,c 1.26 a,b,c 0.01 a 0.22 b 
All partial 0.27 0.50 0.69 0.08 0.49 0.58 0.87 0.03 0.21 
All full 0.65 0.62 1.04 0.06 0.78 0.37 0.66 0.02 0.24 
All sample 0.68 0.93 0.84 0.07 1.01 0.34 0.99 0.02 0.23 
 
This table reports the distribution of country-level variables by governance and tax systems. The overall sample included 212,642 firm-year observations from 24 OECD countries from 1990 to 
2015. We follow Alzahrani and Lasfer (2012) and classify a country as strong (weak) investor protections if its anti-self-dealing index score, as reported by Djankov et al. (2008), is above (below) 
the mean anti-self-dealing index score of the sample. The remaining variables are defined in Appendix 1.  
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively between strong and weak protection. a, b, c significantly different at 1% level between Classical and Partial tax system, 
Classical and Full tax system, and between Full and Partial tax system, using two-tailed t-tests.  
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Appendix 4: Correlation Matrix 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1 Maturity  1.00 
                
2 Inv 0.13*** 1.00 
               
3 CR 0.02* 0.54*** 1.00 
              
4 Classical 0.12*** -0.44*** -0.35*** 1.00 
             
5 TD 0.05** 0.14*** -0.27*** 0.13*** 1.00 
            
6 Leverage 0.48*** -0.04* -0.01* 0.02* -0.04** 1.00 
           
7 MB 0.02* 0.05** 0.02* -0.04* 0.17*** -0.05** 1.00 
          
8 Size 0.11*** -0.07** 0.07** 0.01* 0.10*** 0.02* 0.56*** 1.00 
         
9 AB 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
        
10 ROA 0.01* -0.01* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01* 0.01* 0.00 1.00 
       
11 Tg -0.16*** -0.12*** -0.02* 0.14*** -0.04* -0.14*** -0.06** -0.04* 0.00 0.00 1.00 
      
12 AM 0.03* 0.00 0.02* 0.02* -0.21*** 0.25*** -0.41*** -0.62*** 0.00 0.00 0.11*** 1.00 
     
13 Zscore -0.03* -0.03* 0.01* 0.05** 0.11*** -0.23*** 0.44*** 0.48*** 0.00 0.03* 0.07** -0.39*** 1.00 
    
14 WW index -0.08** -0.03* -0.03* 0.05** 0.01* -0.10** -0.01* -0.09** 0.00 0.00 0.06** -0.04* 0.08** 1.00 
   
15 Dividends 0.06** -0.14*** 0.09** 0.09** -0.15*** 0.19*** -0.04* 0.28*** 0.00 0.02* 0.07** 0.03* 0.05** -0.10** 1.00 
  
16 TS -0.01* -0.38*** -0.35*** 0.15*** -0.02* 0.07** -0.15*** -0.13*** 0.00 0.00 0.07** 0.05** -0.08** -0.01* 0.06** 1.00 
 
17 Bank Dep. -0.16*** -0.36*** -0.05** 0.54*** -0.19*** 0.05** -0.12*** 0.07** 0.00 0.00 0.24*** 0.10** 0.03* 0.04* 0.27*** 0.17*** 1.00 
18 Bank Cred. 0.08** -0.21*** 0.02* -0.13*** -0.11*** 0.05** 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.00 0.00 -0.10** -0.10** 0.05** -0.03* -0.03* 0.10** 0.02* 
19 Ins. Prem. -0.03* 0.23*** 0.18*** 0.05** 0.02* 0.01* 0.08** 0.07** 0.00 0.00 -0.04* -0.01** 0.05** 0.00 0.10** -0.09** 0.07** 
20 Bond Cap. -0.16*** -0.19*** -0.10** 0.45*** -0.21*** -0.03* 0.04* 0.18*** 0.00 0.00 0.21*** 0.02** 0.12*** 0.07** 0.18*** -0.09** 0.68*** 
21 Inter. Debt 0.09** 0.13*** 0.26*** -0.35*** -0.13*** 0.01* -0.01* -0.08** 0.00 0.00 -0.28*** 0.01* -0.12*** -0.07** -0.13*** -0.21*** -0.39*** 
22 Stock Trad 0.04* 0.17*** -0.26*** 0.39*** 0.30*** -0.02* 0.12*** 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.12*** -0.08** 0.04* -0.01* -0.16*** -0.17*** -0.03* 
23 Inflation 0.02* 0.07** 0.06** -0.26*** 0.07** -0.04* 0.12*** 0.09** 0.00 0.00 -0.04* -0.06** 0.06** 0.00 -0.11*** -0.28*** -0.32*** 
24 Saving  0.03* 0.01* 0.07** -0.13*** -0.02* 0.01* 0.05** 0.03* 0.00 0.00 -0.01* 0.00 0.01* 0.00 -0.03* 0.03** -0.04* 
25 Ind. Med 0.07** 0.06** -0.01* -0.05** -0.05** 0.07** -0.10** -0.11*** 0.00 0.00 -0.11*** 0.11*** -0.10** 0.00 -0.04* -0.02* -0.08** 
 
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
     
19 Ins. Prem.  -0.16*** 1.00  
20 Bond Cap.  -0.13*** 0.14*** 1.00 
21 Inter. Debt  0.13*** 0.11*** -0.38*** 1.00 
22 Stock Trad -0.17*** 0.32*** 0.08** 0.02* 1.00 
23 Inflation  0.08** -0.23*** -0.24*** 0.03* -0.05** 1.00 
24 Saving   0.18*** 0.03* 0.02* -0.01* -0.12*** 0.07** 1.00 
25 Ind. Med  0.00 -0.02* -0.09** 0.15*** 0.08** 0.00 -0.04* 1.00 
 
The table presents the Pearson correlation coefficients across our variables. The sample includes 212,642 firm-year observations from 24 OECD countries from 1990 to 2015. The variables are 
defined in Appendix 1. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The data is winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. 
 
 
 
